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Dispute Settlement in the Law of the Sea: Survey for 2015, Part II 
and 2016  
Robin Churchill 
Emeritus Professor of International Law, University of Dundee, Dundee, UK 
Abstract 
This is the latest in a series of annual surveys reviewing dispute settlement in the law 
of the sea, both under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and outside the 
framework of the Convention. It covers developments concerning the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in 2016 and concerning all other law of the sea 
dispute settlement bodies for both 2015 and 2016. The developments covered include 
the awards in Chagos Marine Protected Area (Mauritius v. United Kingdom), South 
China Sea (Philippines v. China), Arctic Sunrise (Netherlands v. Russia) and Duzgit 
Integrity cases, the judgments in the jurisdictional phases of the Norstar and 
Nicaragua/Colombia cases; the prescription of provisional measures by the arbitral 
tribunal in the Enrica Lexie case; and the first ever use of the compulsory conciliation 
procedures of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.   
Keywords  
arbitration; conciliation; dispute settlement; exclusive economic zone; historic rights 
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Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS); islands; law enforcement; protection of the 
marine environment; safety zones; seizure and detention of ships; South China Sea.  
Introduction 
The previous instalment in this Journal’s annual surveys of dispute settlement in the 
law of the sea covered developments at the ITLOS in 2015. This instalment deals with 
developments at the ITLOS in 2016 and at all other international courts and tribunals 
for both 2015 and 2016. It thus covers the arbitral awards in Chagos Marine 
Protected Area, South China Sea, Arctic Sunrise and Duzgit Integrity cases; the 
judgments, by the ITLOS and the ICJ respectively, in the separate jurisdictional 
phases of the Norstar and Nicaragua/Colombia cases; the prescription of provisional 
measures by the arbitral tribunal in the Enrica Lexie case; the first ever use of the 
compulsory conciliation procedures of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(LOSC)1 (between Timor-Leste and Australia); the initiation of Annex VII arbitration 
by Ukraine against Russia; and the decision of the arbitral tribunal in the 
Croatia/Slovenia case to continue its work after the major upheaval in its proceedings 
in 2015.  
These developments have shed new light on both jurisdictional aspects of 
dispute settlement under the LOSC and on its substantive provisions. The former 
include Articles 281 (on agreements that exclude the dispute settlement procedures of 
the LOSC), 283 (on the requirement for an exchange of views regarding the means for 
1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, in force 16 
November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3. 
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settling a dispute prior to its unilateral referral to a court or tribunal), 295 (on 
exhaustion of local remedies), 297 (exceptions to compulsory dispute settlement) and 
298 (on the conditions for compulsory conciliation). The most noteworthy judicial 
pronouncements on the substantive provisions of the LOSC relate to historic rights, 
the regime of islands, the law enforcement powers of coastal States in their maritime 
zones, hot pursuit, the relationship between the rights of coastal and other States in the 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and protection of the marine environment.    
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea during 2016 
At the beginning of 2016 two cases were ongoing before the ITLOS – Case No. 23, a 
maritime boundary dispute brought by Ghana against Côte d’Ivoire, and Case No 25, 
M/V Norstar, concerning the seizure and detention of a Panamanian vessel by Italy. In 
the former case written proceedings were completed during 2016. In the Norstar case 
the ITLOS gave a judgment in the separate jurisdictional phase of the case in 
November 2016, and this is discussed in more detail below.  
Case No. 25: M/V “Norstar” (Panama v. Italy) 
On 17 December 2015 Panama instituted proceedings against Italy. It argued that 
Italy had breached Articles 33, 73, 87, 111, 226 and 300 of the LOSC in seizing and 
detaining a Panamanian oil tanker, the M/V Norstar, and claimed as a consequence 
US$10 million in compensation for damage to the vessel and losses suffered by its 
owner. In 1998 the Public Prosecutor at the Court of Savona (in Italy) issued a decree 
of seizure against the Norstar in connection with the prosecution of eight persons for 
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alleged smuggling of mineral oils, the Norstar being viewed as the corpus delicti of 
the alleged offences. Following a request from the Public Prosecutor at Savona, the 
Spanish authorities seized the Norstar while at anchor in Spanish internal waters. In 
2003 the court at Savona acquitted the accused of all charges and ordered the release 
of the Norstar. That ruling was confirmed on appeal in 2005. Following its ruling in 
2003, the court at Savona requested the Spanish authorities to release the Norstar. 
They had not done so by 2006; and it is unclear from the available materials when, or 
even whether, they subsequently did so.  
On 11 March 2016 Italy raised preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the 
ITLOS and the admissibility of Panama’s application. Proceedings on the merits were 
therefore suspended. Following the submission of written pleadings on the question of 
jurisdiction and admissibility and a hearing, the ITLOS delivered its judgment on 4 
November 2016.2  
Italy contested the jurisdiction of the ITLOS on three grounds: (1) there was 
no dispute between Panama and Italy; (2) Italy was the wrong respondent and, in any 
case, adjudication of Panama’s claim would require the ITLOS to ascertain rights and 
obligations pertaining to Spain in the latter’s absence; and (3) Panama had failed to 
pursue settlement of the dispute by negotiation or other peaceful means under Article 
283 of the LOSC.  
Before dealing with those points, the ITLOS considered Panama’s declaration 
under Article 287 choosing the ITLOS as the means “for the settlement of the dispute 
between [Panama and Italy] concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS 
that arose from the detention of the Motor Tanker NORSTAR.” The ITLOS observed 
2 M/V “Norstar” (Panama v. Italy), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 4 November, available at 
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.25/Preliminary_Objections/Judgment/C
25_Judgment_04.11.16_orig.pdf; accessed 31 July 2017. 
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that the LOSC “does not preclude a declaration limited to a particular dispute” (para. 
58), but it also noted that where two declarations did not coincide (as in the present 
case), its jurisdiction was confined to the terms of the narrower declaration. One 
might conclude, therefore, that in this case the jurisdiction of the ITLOS would be 
limited to the dispute concerning the “detention” of the Norstar. However, the ITLOS 
noted that in its application, Panama had referred to the “arrest and detention by Italy” 
of the Norstar, and that it had used the same terminology in its communications with 
Italy. “Therefore, in the view of the Tribunal, the Application is consistent with the 
terms of the declaration of Panama” (para. 59). The purport of that statement is 
unclear, but it appears to suggest that the ITLOS has jurisdiction in respect of both the 
“arrest” and the “detention” of the Norstar. This is borne out later in the judgment, as 
will be seen.    
The ITLOS then turned to Italy’s first jurisdictional objection. Panama, mainly 
through a lawyer in private practice whom it had authorised to act on its behalf, had 
sent a number of communications to Italy between 2004 and 2010 complaining of the 
illegal detention of the Norstar. Italy acknowledged receipt of one of those 
communications, but otherwise failed to respond. Assessing whether in those 
circumstances there could be a dispute between the parties, the ITLOS recalled the 
jurisprudence of the ICJ according to which the existence of a dispute could be 
inferred from the failure of a State to respond to a claim in circumstances where a 
response was called for, and that a disagreement on a point of law or fact or a conflict 
of legal views need not necessarily be stated expressis verbis but could be established 
by inference. The ITLOS thus concluded that “Italy cannot rely on its silence to cast 
doubt on the existence of a dispute between the Parties. In the view of the Tribunal, 
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the existence of such a dispute can be inferred from Italy’s failure to respond to the 
questions raised by Panama regarding the detention of the M/V “Norstar” (para. 101). 
The next question was whether that dispute related to the interpretation or 
application of the LOSC. Referring to its judgment in the Louisa case,3 the ITLOS 
noted that in order to determine whether a dispute concerned the interpretation or 
application of the LOSC, it had to establish a link between the facts advanced by 
Panama (the Decree of Seizure against the Norstar) and the provisions of the LOSC 
referred to, and show that such provisions could sustain the claims made. Of the 
various articles of the LOSC invoked by Panama, most were easily disposed of. 
Panama itself in the oral proceedings conceded that Articles 73 and 226 were not 
applicable. Nor, in the view of the ITLOS, were Articles 33 (on the contiguous zone) 
or 111 (on hot pursuit) applicable as Italy had not claimed to be acting under either of 
those provisions. That left Articles 87 and 300. On Article 87 the ITLOS concluded 
that “[t]he Decree of Seizure by the Public Prosecutor at the Court of Savona against 
the M/V ‘Norstar’ with regard to activities conducted by that vessel on the high seas 
and the request for its execution by the Prosecutor at the Court of Savona may be 
viewed as an infringement of the rights of Panama under Article 87 as the flag State of 
the vessel. Consequently, the Tribunal concludes that Article 87 is relevant to the 
present case” (para. 122, emphasis added). That is a surprisingly tentative statement, 
given that the ITLOS was making a definitive ruling about jurisdiction. If the ITLOS 
was not sure, it might have been better advised to decide that Italy’s objection raised 
matters that did not possess an exclusively preliminary character and therefore defer 
the issue of jurisdiction to the merits. Be that as it may, it is difficult to see how a 
3 M/V “Louisa” (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Kingdom of Spain), Judgment, ITLOS Reports 
2013, p. 4, at p. 32, para. 99. 
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request to the Spanish authorities to detain the Norstar could, in itself, interfere with 
Panama’s freedom of navigation on the high seas. The approach of the ITLOS opens 
the way to any detention of a vessel by a State other than the flag State being 
challenged as a breach of Article 87. Furthermore, it is difficult to reconcile the ruling 
of the ITLOS with its finding in the Louisa case that “[a]rticle 87 cannot be 
interpreted in such a way as to grant [a ship detained in port] a right to leave the port 
and gain access to the high seas notwithstanding its detention in the context of legal 
proceedings against it”.4 Regrettably, the ITLOS made no attempt to distinguish the 
Louisa case, nor does it even refer to it in the one brief paragraph that discusses 
Article 87. On Article 300 (which requires States parties to fulfil their LOSC 
obligations in good faith), the ITLOS repeats its established case law that the Article 
cannot be invoked on its own, but only in conjunction with a substantive obligation. 
That leads the ITLOS to “consider that the question arises as to whether Italy has 
fulfilled in good faith the obligations assumed by it under article 87 of the 
Convention. Therefore, the Tribunal is of the view that article 300 of the Convention 
is relevant to the present case” (para. 132).  
Turning to Italy’s second objection to jurisdiction, there were two questions to 
be considered: was Italy the proper respondent in this case, and was any third party 
indispensable to the proceedings. On the first question, the ITLOS considered that it 
was clear from the facts of the case that, while the arrest of the Norstar took place as 
the result of judicial cooperation between Italy and Spain, the decree of seizure issued 
by the court at Savona and the request for its enforcement by the Italian Public 
Prosecutor were central to the eventual arrest of the Norstar. Without that decree, 
4 Ibid., para. 109. For a cogent and more detailed criticism of the approach of the ITLOS to Article 87 
in the present case, see the Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Wolfrum and Attard, paras. 33-42.   
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there would have been no arrest. Italy was therefore the proper respondent. Nor was 
Spain an indispensable third party. The dispute before the ITLOS concerned the rights 
and obligations of Italy. The involvement of Spain in the dispute was limited to the 
execution of Italy’s request for the seizure of the Norstar. Accordingly, it was the 
legal interests of Italy, not those of Spain, that formed the subject matter of the 
decision to be rendered on the merits. This conclusion appears to be dependent on the 
jurisdiction of the ITLOS covering the arrest of the Norstar as well as its detention. 
As observed earlier, this is questionable. In the absence of any information in the 
judgment as to whether the Spanish authorities eventually released the Norstar from 
detention, the finding that Spain was not an indispensable third party may have been 
premature. The ITLOS might, therefore, have been better advised to have deferred 
this jurisdictional issue to the merits stage.  
As regards Italy’s third objection to jurisdiction, non-compliance with Article 
283 of the LOSC, the ITLOS found that Panama had made a number of attempts to 
engage with Italy as to the means by which the dispute might be settled, but there had 
been no response from Italy. Panama was therefore justified in assuming that to 
continue attempts to exchange views could not have yielded a positive result and that 
it had fulfilled its obligation under Article 283.  
 Having rejected all of Italy’s objections to jurisdiction (by 21 votes to 1 
(Judge ad hoc Treves)), the ITLOS turned to consider various objections raised by 
Italy to the admissibility of Panama’s application. Italy’s first objection was that the 
case was predominantly one of diplomatic protection: Panama could not exercise 
diplomatic protection on behalf of non-nationals (as it was seeking to do), and in any 
case those persons had failed to exhaust domestic remedies as required by Article 295 
of the LOSC. The ITLOS, following its judgments in the Saiga (No. 2) and Virginia G 
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cases, held that the Norstar was to be considered a unit as regards the right of 
Panama, as the flag State, to seek reparation for loss or damage caused to the Norstar 
by the acts of Italy. Thus, the Norstar, everything on it and every person involved or 
interested in its operations were to be treated as an entity linked to Panama and the 
nationalities of those persons was irrelevant. On the question of the requirement to 
exhaust local remedies, the ITLOS recalled its earlier finding that the case concerned 
the alleged violation of Panama’s right under Article 87 of the LOSC. “[A] violation 
of that right would amount to a direct injury to Panama” (para. 270). “[T]he claim for 
damage to the persons and entities with an interest in the ship or its cargo arises from 
the alleged injury to Panama. Accordingly, the Tribunal concludes that the claims in 
respect of such damage are not subject to the rule of exhaustion of local remedies” 
(para.271). This formulation seems to blur the distinction between a claim for a direct 
injury to a State and a claim for an indirect injury. An injury to “persons and entities 
with an interest in the ship” is an indirect injury. If Panama had suffered only a direct 
injury, the “ship as a unit” doctrine would be irrelevant. If, on the other hand, Panama 
had suffered both direct and indirect injury, the exhaustion of local remedies would be 
required if the indirect injury was the preponderant claim.5 Whether the injury to 
Panama is direct or indirect will (or at least should) be relevant again when the ITLOS 
has to decide whether Panama should be awarded the compensation that it has sought.  
Italy’s second objection to the admissibility of Italy’s claim was that it was 
time-barred, being brought 18 years after the events giving rise to the dispute. Relying 
on the commentary of the International Law Commission on its draft Articles on State 
Responsibility and the case law of the ICJ, the ITLOS noted that neither the LOSC 
nor general international law provided a time-limit regarding the institution of judicial 
5 See further the discussion below at notes 21-4. 
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proceedings. In any case Panama had not failed to pursue its claim since the time 
when it was first made. The ITLOS therefore dismissed, by 20 votes to 2 (Judge Cot 
and Judge ad hoc Treves), both of Italy’s objections that Panama’s application was 
inadmissible.   
Overall, the judgment of the ITLOS is not very satisfactory. It appears to have 
given Panama the benefit of the doubt on a number of significant jurisdictional points. 
While the vagueness of some of the ITLOS’s conclusions may be explained by the 
need to craft a judgment to attract the greatest possible support in what, on this 
occasion, was a 22-member court, it hardly justifies them. As revealed in the 
declarations and separate opinions given by six of the judges, there were considerably 
more nuanced views among a number of the individual judges.  
Arbitration in accordance with Annex VII during 2015 and 2016 
At the beginning of 2015 four arbitrations conducted under Annex VII of the LOSC 
were ongoing – the Chagos Marine Protected Area (Mauritius v. United Kingdom), 
South China Sea (Philippines v. China), Arctic Sunrise (Netherlands v. Russia) and 
Duzgit Integrity (Malta v. São Tomé and Príncipe) cases. During 2015, the arbitral 
tribunals delivered their awards in the Chagos Marine Protected Area and Arctic 
Sunrise cases, and the tribunal in the South China Sea case delivered an award on 
jurisdiction and admissibility. Its award on the merits was delivered in 2016, as was 
the award in the Duzgit Integrity case. During 2015 and 2016 two new Annex VII 
arbitrations were begun: the Enrica Lexie Incident case between Italy and India (in 
2015) and the Dispute concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov 
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and Kerch Strait case between Ukraine and Russia (in 2016). The tribunal in the 
Enrica Lexie Incident case made an order of provisional measures in 2016. 
Developments in all six cases are discussed below.  
Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v. United Kingdom) 
In this case, begun in December 2010, Mauritius challenged the legality of the 
establishment by the United Kingdom in April 2010 of a marine protected area 
(MPA) in the whole of the 200 nm zone around the Chagos Archipelago, which is 
administered by the United Kingdom. The tribunal to hear the case comprised 
Professor Ivan Shearer (president), Judge Wolfrum (nominated by Mauritius), Judge 
Greenwood (nominated by the United Kingdom), Judge Hoffmann and Judge Kateka. 
The tribunal delivered its award on 18 March 2015.6    
Mauritius made four submissions in the proceedings, requesting the Tribunal 
to find that:  
1. The United Kingdom was not entitled to declare an MPA or other maritime
zones because it was not the “coastal State” for the purposes of the LOSC;
2. Given the commitments that it had made to Mauritius, the United Kingdom
was not entitled unilaterally to declare an MPA or other maritime zones
because Mauritius had rights as a “coastal State” for the purposes of the
LOSC;
6 In the Matter of the Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v. United Kingdom), 
available at https://files.pca-cpa.org/pcadocs/MU-UK%2020150318%20Award.pdf; accessed 31 July 
2017. For comment, see, inter alia, LN Nguyen, ‘The Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration: Has 
the Scope of LOSC Compulsory Jurisdiction been Clarified?’ (2016) 31 IJMCL 120-143; W Qu, ‘The 
Issue of Jurisdiction over Mixed Disputes: “The Chagos Maritime Protection Area Arbitration and 
Beyond’ (2016) 47 Ocean Development and International Law (ODIL) 40-51; and S Talmon, ‘The 
Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration: Expansion of the Jurisdiction of UNCLOS Part XV Courts 
and Tribunals’ (2016) 65 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 727-51.  
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3. The United Kingdom could not prevent the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf from acting on any submission that Mauritius might make 
regarding the Chagos Archipelago; and  
4. The MPA was incompatible with the United Kingdom’s substantive and 
procedural obligations under Articles 2, 55, 56, 63, 64, 194 and 300 of the 
LOSC and Article 7 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.  
The United Kingdom argued that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction in relation to all four 
of Mauritius’s four submissions.  
Having in 2013 rejected a request from the United Kingdom to deal with 
jurisdictional issues as a preliminary matter, the tribunal dealt at length with 
jurisdictional issues in the earlier part of its award. As regards Mauritius’s first 
submission, the United Kingdom argued that it was in reality a claim to sovereignty 
over the Chagos Archipelago and therefore did not concern the interpretation and 
application of the LOSC. By a majority of three votes to two (Judges Kateka and 
Wolfrum), the tribunal agreed. Mauritius’s first submission was “properly 
characterised” as a dispute relating to land sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago. 
“The Parties’ differing views on the ‘coastal State’ for the purposes of the Convention 
are simply one aspect of this larger dispute” (para. 212). It was clear from the 
negotiating history of the LOSC that its dispute settlement system was not intended to 
be used to resolve sovereignty disputes. While it was possible that minor questions of 
sovereignty could be considered if they were ancillary to a main dispute concerning 
the LOSC, that was not the case here. There was, therefore, no dispute concerning the 
interpretation or application of the LOSC, and so the tribunal lacked the jurisdiction. 
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The tribunal reached a similar conclusion in relation to Mauritius’s second 
submission.7  
As for Mauritius’s third submission, the tribunal unanimously held that there 
was no dispute between the parties concerning submissions to the Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf and it was therefore not required to rule on whether it 
had jurisdiction.  
In relation to Mauritius’s fourth submission, the United Kingdom argued that 
the tribunal lacked jurisdiction because of Article 297(3) of the LOSC, which 
excludes disputes concerning a coastal State’s sovereign rights to the living resources 
of the EEZ from compulsory dispute settlement. The tribunal unanimously rejected 
the argument that Article 297(3) could operate as a blanket ban on its jurisdiction. The 
MPA was not a measure solely relating to fisheries. Although commercial fishing was 
prohibited in the MPA, it was evident from the United Kingdom’s statements when 
establishing the MPA that its primary purpose was to protect the marine environment. 
Furthermore, coral, which was a particular focus of that protection, was a sedentary 
species within the meaning of Article 77(4) of the LOSC: such species were excluded 
from the regime of the EEZ by Article 68, and thus beyond any possible application 
of Article 297(3). However, insofar as Mauritius claimed rights relating to fishing in 
the EEZ of the Chagos Archipelago, the tribunal’s jurisdiction was excluded by 
Article 297(3). So, too, were Mauritius’s claims of breaches of Articles 63 and 64 of 
the LOSC and Article 7 of the Fish Stocks Agreement, the tribunal thereby rejecting 
the argument of some commentators that Article 297(3) does not apply to straddling 
stocks. The tribunal then made some interesting observations about Article 297(1), 
7 Lack of space precludes further discussion of the tribunal’s consideration of the first two submissions 
and the views of the two dissenting arbitrators. For such discussion, see the literature referred to in the 
previous note.  
13
which deals with the situations where compulsory dispute settlement does apply in 
relation to the EEZ. It concluded that this provision expands the jurisdiction of LOSC 
courts and tribunals to certain instruments other than the LOSC.8  Overall, the tribunal 
concluded that it had jurisdiction to consider Mauritius’ fourth submission in relation 
to Articles 2(3) and 56(2) of the LOSC, insofar as they related to Mauritius’s claimed 
rights, as well as in relation to Articles 194 and 300. 
The tribunal then turned to consider whether there had been the exchange of 
views required by Article 283 of the LOSC. According to the tribunal, the purpose of 
Article 283 was “to ensure that a State would not be taken entirely by surprise by the 
initiation of compulsory proceedings. It [Article 283] should be applied as such, but 
without an undue formalism as to the manner and precision with which views were 
exchanged and understood” (para. 382). Here that test was satisfied, each party having 
made it clear to the other that their preferred means of settling the dispute was 
negotiation, albeit in each case subject to conditions that were incompatible. The 
tribunal also discussed whether it was necessary to engage in negotiations relating to 
the substance of a dispute (as opposed to the means of resolving it) before resorting 
unilaterally to compulsory dispute settlement. Noting that the LOSC did not expressly 
contain such a requirement, the tribunal observed that “to the extent that such a 
requirement could be considered to be implied from the structure of sections 1 and 2 
of Part XV” (para. 379), Mauritius had met that requirement. It is curious that the 
tribunal makes no mention of Article 286 of the LOSC, which provides that a matter 
may be referred for compulsory dispute settlement only “where no settlement has 
been reached by recourse to section 1” of Part XV, which requires the parties to a 
8 See paras. 306-22. For further discussion of this part of the award, see, apart from the literature in 
note 6, S Allen, ‘Article 297 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Scope of 
Mandatory Jurisdiction’ (2017) 48(3) ODIL (in press) (available online).  
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dispute to seek to settle it by negotiations or the other means listed in Article 33 of the 
UN Charter.       
Having disposed of all the jurisdictional and other preliminary issues, the 
tribunal was able finally, three-quarters of the way through its 215-page award, to 
address the merits. It did so by considering, first, the content of Mauritius’s rights in 
the territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf in the area covered by the MPA, and, 
secondly, whether the United Kingdom’s declaration of the MPA was in breach of 
those provisions of the LOSC in respect of which the tribunal had jurisdiction. As 
regards the first point, in 1965, at a conference held at Lancaster House in London in 
preparation for Mauritius’s eventual independence, the United Kingdom had given 
various undertakings to Mauritius, including fishing rights in the waters of the Chagos 
Archipelago, mineral rights in the seabed and subsoil around the Archipelago, and a 
right to the eventual return of the Archipelago when no longer needed for defence 
purposes (the United Kingdom has leased the largest island of the Archipelago to the 
USA as a military base since 1966). In the view of the tribunal those undertakings 
were part of the quid pro quo for procuring the agreement of Mauritius to the 
detachment of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius to be administered separately 
as British Indian Ocean Territory (previously the two had been administered by the 
United Kingdom as a single unit). Once Mauritius became independent in 1968, the 
package deal comprising the Lancaster House undertakings and Mauritius’s 
agreement to the detachment became an international agreement. Although that 
agreement did not expressly deal with its legal status, the tribunal’s objective 
determination was that it was legally binding. That conclusion was supported by the 
fact that after Mauritius became independent, the United Kingdom had repeated and 
reaffirmed the Lancaster House undertakings on numerous occasions. Furthermore, as 
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Mauritius had relied on those undertakings and was entitled to so, the United 
Kingdom was estopped from denying their legally binding effect.9  
The parties disagreed on the scope of the fishing rights referred to in the 
Lancaster House undertakings. The tribunal ruled that those rights including fishing in 
the territorial sea of the Chagos Archipelago (the only aspect of fisheries for which 
the tribunal had jurisdiction), subject to possessing a licence issued free by the United 
Kingdom and “dependent on the overarching defence needs of the United States and 
the United Kingdom’s discretion in the routine management of the fishery” (para. 
455).    
Having identified the rights of Mauritius in the area covered by the MPA, the 
tribunal then turned to consider whether, when establishing the MPA, the United 
Kingdom had breached the provisions of the LOSC in respect of which it had 
jurisdiction. That involved interpreting Articles 2(3), 56(2) and 194, none of which 
have previously been interpreted by an international court. Article 2(3) provides that a 
coastal State’s sovereignty over its territorial sea “is exercised subject to this 
Convention and to other rules of international law.” Although the English-language 
version of Article 3(2) could be read as being purely descriptive (“is exercised”), the 
tribunal considered that the other authentic language texts, the context, the object and 
purpose of the LOSC and the negotiating history “lead to the interpretation that 
Article 2(3) contains an obligation on States to exercise their sovereignty subject to 
‘other rules of international law’” (para. 514). As regards what those “other rules” 
were, in the tribunal’s view they were limited “general rules of international law” 
(para. 516) and did not include the Lancaster House undertakings. Nevertheless, 
9 Paras. 435-9 contain a useful summary of the doctrine of estoppel in international law. 
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“general international law requires the United Kingdom to act in good faith in its 
relations with Mauritius, including with respect to undertakings” (para. 517). 
As for Article 56(2), which requires a coastal State when exercising its rights 
and performing its duties in the EEZ to have “due regard” to the rights and duties of 
other States, the tribunal declined to find in that obligation “any universal rules of 
conduct” (para. 519). The obligation did not mean that any impairment of Mauritius’s 
rights must be avoided, but nor did it permit the United Kingdom to proceed as it 
wished. “Rather, the extent of the regard required by the [LOS] Convention will 
depend on the nature of the rights held by Mauritius, their importance, the extent of 
the anticipated impairment, the nature and importance of the activities contemplated 
by the United Kingdom, and the availability of alternative approaches. In the majority 
of cases, this assessment will necessarily involve at least some consultation with the 
rights-holding State” (para. 519). 
The tribunal considered the obligations in Articles 2(3) and 56(2) to be 
equivalent. Mauritius’s rights had been significantly affected by the establishment of 
the MPA since its fishing rights had been extinguished and the condition of the 
Archipelago would be affected when returned to Mauritius. That meant that the 
United Kingdom should have consulted Mauritius properly and balanced its rights and 
interests with those of Mauritius. It had done neither of those things, and thus in 
establishing the MPA, the United Kingdom had breached Articles 2(3) and 56 of the 
LOSC.           
Turning to Article 194 of the LOSC, a preliminary question was whether that 
article was limited to pollution and so was not applicable to wider environmental 
matters, such as MPAs. Article 194 is headed “Measures to prevent, reduce and 
control pollution of the marine environment” and its first four paragraphs refer only to 
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pollution, not to wider environmental protection. The tribunal makes no mention of 
those features of Article 194. Instead, it refers only to the fifth and final paragraph of 
Article 194 which provides that “[t]he measures taken in accordance with this Part 
[i.e. Part XII of the LOSC] shall include those necessary to protect” certain kinds of 
ecosystems and habitats. From this the tribunal concludes that Article 194 is “not 
limited to measures aimed strictly at controlling pollution and extends to measures 
focussed primarily on conservation and the preservation of ecosystems”, such as the 
MPA. While the tribunal’s finding about the scope of Article 194 may be desirable on 
policy grounds, it seems difficult to reconcile it with the text of Article 194. Be that as 
it may, the tribunal then considered whether the United Kingdom complied with the 
first and fourth paragraphs of Article 194. Article 194(1) requires States to 
“endeavour to harmonize their policies in this connection [i.e. to prevent marine 
pollution].” The tribunal rejected the United Kingdom’s view that Article 194(1) 
imposes no obligations and held that it requires States to use their “best efforts” to 
harmonize their policies (para. 539). However, there was no particular deadline for 
the United Kingdom to harmonize its policies with Mauritius. In the limited life to 
date of the MPA, the United Kingdom had not violated that obligation.  Article 194(4) 
requires States in taking measures to prevent marine pollution to “refrain from 
unjustifiable interference with activities carried out by other States in the exercise of 
their rights.” The tribunal considered this obligation to be “functionally equivalent” to 
the obligations in Article 2(3) and 56(2) discussed above and to require “a balancing 
act between competing rights, based upon an evaluation of the extent of the 
interference, the availability of alternatives, and the importance of the rights and 
policies at issue” (para. 540). The United Kingdom had failed to carry out such a 
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balancing act with respect to Mauritian fishing activities in the territorial sea of the 
Chagos Archipelago and therefore had violated Article 194(4) of the LOSC. 
Finally, on Mauritius’s claim that the United Kingdom had breached Article 
300, the tribunal found no evidence of bad faith or abuse of rights. Overall, therefore 
the tribunal found that the United Kingdom had breached Articles 2(3), 56(2) and 
194(4) of the LOSC in establishing an MPA around the Chagos Archipelago. As to 
how that breach might be remedied and the MPA lawfully established, the tribunal 
concluded its award by observing that “it is now open to the Parties to enter into the 
negotiations that the Tribunal would have expected prior to the proclamation of the 
MPA, with a view to achieving a mutually satisfactory arrangement for protecting the 
marine environment, to the extent necessary under a ‘sovereignty umbrella’” (para. 
544). Whether such negotiations have taken place the writer does not know.  
The tribunal’s reasoning on the merits is by no means always easy to follow or 
convincing. The tribunal assumes, without really explaining why, that one State can 
have rights in another State’s EEZ additional to those listed in Article 58(1) of the 
LOSC. As will be seen below, the tribunal in the South China Sea case took the 
opposite view. The latter position seems more in keeping with the regime of the EEZ 
under the LOSC. Even if the tribunal in the present case is right about this matter, it is 
difficult to see why the two Lancaster House undertakings identified by the tribunal as 
Mauritius’s rights in the EEZ of the Chagos Archipelago are EEZ rights. One of those 
undertakings is to mineral rights in the seabed and subsoil around the Archipelago. 
Article 56(3) of the LOSC provides that a coastal State’s rights to the resources of the 
seabed and subsoil are to be exercised in accordance with Part VI (on the continental 
shelf). One might have thought that Mauritius’s mineral rights would also be 
exercisable under Part VI, and that the United Kingdom’s due regard obligation under 
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Article 56(2) would therefore not be applicable. Furthermore, given that under the 
LOSC a coastal State has exclusive rights to its continental shelf resources, there must 
be doubt as to whether another State’s right to those resources that originated many 
years before the adoption of the LOSC would survive the latter’s entry into force in 
the light of Article 311(2). Mauritius’s other right is to the eventual return of the 
Chagos Archipelago when no longer needed for defence purposes. It is difficult to see 
how this can be a right exercisable in the EEZ in the way that, say, navigation and 
overflight are.   
While the Chagos MPA case is all about a marine protected area, because of 
the way that the dispute was framed, the award actually tells us rather little about 
international law relating to MPAs, for example the legal basis for establishing an 
MPA in the EEZ. It provides some insights into the procedural conditions that must 
be observed in establishing an MPA in the territorial sea and EEZ, albeit in the 
context of the highly unusual relations prevailing between Mauritius and the United 
Kingdom. As the tribunal itself acknowledged, “it had taken no view on the 
substantive quality or nature of the MPA or on the importance of environmental 
protection. The Tribunal’s concern has been with the manner in which the MPA was 
established, not its substance” (par. 544).    
 
South China Sea (Philippines v. China) 
In this arbitration, initiated in 2013, the Philippines sought a ruling on its and China’s 
respective maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, including China’s claim to 
rights within its so-called “nine-dash line”, and on the lawfulness of certain Chinese 
activities. The tribunal hearing the case comprised Judge Mensah (president), Judge 
Cot, Judge Pawlak, Professor Soons and Judge Wolfrum. Although China declined to 
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take part in the proceedings, it sent the tribunal a position paper in December 2014 in 
which it raised various objections to the jurisdiction of the tribunal. The tribunal 
decided that it would treat that paper as a plea concerning its jurisdiction, which 
meant that under its Rules of Procedure it should rule on it as a preliminary 
question.10 That ruling was given on 29 October 2015.11 
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility 
In its award the tribunal dealt not only with the objections to its jurisdiction raised in 
China’s position paper, but also with a number of other possible reasons why it might 
not have jurisdiction or the case might not be admissible.  
The tribunal began with issues of admissibility. It found that it was properly 
constituted; that in accordance with Article 9 of Annex VII of the LOSC, China’s 
non-participation in the proceedings did not deprive it of jurisdction; and that the 
institution of proceedings by the Philippines was not an abuse of legal process.  
The tribunal then turned to the first issue of jurisdiction, namely whether there 
was a dispute between the parties and, if so, whether that dispute concerned the 
interpretation and application of the LOSC. The tribunal noted that there was clearly a 
dispute between the parties concerning sovereignty over certain maritime features in 
the South China Sea, but rejected China’s claim that this deprived the tribunal of 
jurisdiction. There were also disputes about matters other than sovereignty and the 
resolution of those disputes did not require the tribunal to reach a preliminary decision 
10 Procedural Order No. 4 of 21 April 2015, available at https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1807; 
accessed 25 July 2017. 
11 Philippines v. China, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 29 October 2015, available at 
http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1506; accessed 3 October 2016. For comment, see, inter 
alia, Special Issue in (2016) 15(2) Chinese Journal of International Law 217-487; and J Gao, ‘The 
Obligation to Negotiate in the Philippines v. China Case: A Critique of the Award on Jurisdiction’ 
(2016) 47(3) ODIL 272-88. 
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as to which State had sovereignty over the maritime features concerned. China had 
also argued in its position paper that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction because the case 
was about maritime boundary delimitation, which China had excluded from 
compulsory dispute settlement by a declaration under Article 298. The tribunal 
observed, however, that a dispute over the entitlement of a maritime feature to 
maritime zones was distinct from a dispute concerning the delimitation of those 
zones.  
The tribunal then turned to examine whether there was a dispute concerning 
the issues that formed the subject matter of the Philippines’ application. A preliminary 
problem was that China had not elaborated on some of its claimed rights and 
entitlements in the South China Sea. That made it difficult to determine whether there 
was the opposition of views necessary for the existence of a dispute. However, the 
tribunal held that it was entitled to draw appropriate inferences from China’s conduct 
and to evaluate the position objectively, without “allowing ambiguity in a party’s 
expression of its position to frustrate the resolution of a genuine dispute through 
arbitration” (para. 163). The tribunal then examined the 15 submissions made by the 
Philippines and found that there was a dispute in relation to all of them, and that those 
disputes concerned the interpretation and application of the LOSC. Even though 
China’s claimed historic rights might be understood to exist independently of the 
LOSC, a dispute concerning the interaction of the LOSC “with another instrument or 
body of law, including the question of whether rights arising under another body of 
law were or were not preserved by the Convention, is unequivocally a dispute 
concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention” (para. 168).  
Having found that there were no third parties indispensable to the proceedings, 
whose non-participation would deprive it of jurisdiction, the tribunal turned to the 
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preconditions for the exercise of its jurisdiction in Articles 281, 282, 283 and 286 of 
the LOSC. Article 281 provides that where the parties to a dispute concerning the 
LOSC “have agreed to seek settlement of the dispute by a peaceful means of their 
own choice, the procedures provided for in [Part XV of the LOSC] apply only where 
no settlement has been reached by recourse to such means and the agreement between 
the parties does not exclude any further procedure.” The tribunal commented on the 
various elements of this provision. It assumed, without further explanation, that 
Article 281 referred to legally binding agreements. The requirement that no settlement 
has been reached by recourse to such an agreement “does not require the parties to 
pursue any agreed means of settlement indefinitely” (para. 220). As for the stipulation 
that an agreement exclude any further procedure for settling a dispute, the tribunal 
held that an agreement must “expressly” exclude any further such procedure. That 
contradicts the finding of the tribunal in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case, which found 
that an implied exclusion was sufficient. The tribunal in the present case characterised 
that view as “not in line with the intended meaning of Article 281” (para. 223).12 The 
tribunal examined a number of instruments to determine whether they were 
agreements falling within Article 281. It found that the Declaration on the Conduct of 
Parties in the South China Sea (2002) “was not intended to be a legally binding 
agreement with respect to dispute resolution” (para. 217); that various bilateral 
statements of the parties were not legally binding; and that the provisions on dispute 
settlement in the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia (1976) were not 
legally binding, as they applied only where the parties to a particular dispute 
specifically agreed to use them for that dispute.            
12 Further on the question of express or implied exclusion, see N Klein, ‘The Vicissitudes of Dispute 
Settlement under the Law of the Sea Convention’ (2017) 32 IJMCL 332-63, at pp. 335-40  
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Having made that finding, the tribunal then considered whether Article 282 
might be applicable. This article provides that if the parties to a dispute concerning 
the LOSC “have agreed, through a general, regional or bilateral agreement or 
otherwise, that such dispute shall, at the request of any party to the dispute, be 
submitted to a procedure that entails a binding decision, that procedure shall apply in 
lieu of the procedures provided for in [Part XV of the LOSC], unless the parties to the 
dispute otherwise agree.” The tribunal considered whether any of the instruments that 
it had examined in relation to Article 281 were agreements within the meaning of 
Article 282. Not surprisingly, in the light of its discussion of Article 281, the tribunal 
found that none of them were, not least because none of them provided for submission 
to a procedure entailing a binding decision. 
Next for consideration was Article 283, which requires the parties to a dispute, 
when it arises, to “proceed expeditiously to an exchange of views regarding its 
settlement by negotiation or other peaceful means.” China had argued in its position 
paper that there had been no exchange of views. The tribunal disagreed. It followed 
the Chagos MPA and Arctic Sunrise cases in holding that where a dispute arose with 
sufficient clarity that the parties were aware of the issues in respect of which they 
disagreed, Article 283 required them to engage in some exchange of views with 
regard to the means of settling the dispute, although not in relation to its substance. 
The tribunal examined the dealings between the parties and was “convinced that the 
Parties have unequivocally exchanged views regarding the possible means of settling 
the disputes between them . . . [but have] failed to reach agreement on the approach to 
resolving the disputes” (paras. 342-3). The tribunal therefore considered Article 283 
to have been satisfied.     
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China’s position paper also raised a question separate from Article 283, 
namely whether there was an obligation to engage in negotiations on the substance of 
a dispute before resorting to compulsory dispute settlement. The tribunal referred to 
Article 279, which provides that the parties to a dispute shall seek its resolution by the 
means indicated in Article 33 of the UN Charter (which include negotiations), and 
Article 286, which provides that any dispute relating to the LOSC may, “where no 
settlement has been reached by recourse to section 1” of Part XV (which includes 
Article 279), be referred to compulsory dispute settlement. The tribunal decided that it 
was “unnecessary to determine precisely the full scope of the obligation to seek a 
solution through recourse to section 1 of Part XV . . . This is because the Tribunal is 
satisfied that the Philippines did seek to negotiate with China concerning the disputes 
presented in these proceedings and that its obligations under the [LOSC] . . . have 
accordingly been satisfied” (para. 347). It did not matter that those negotiations did 
not address all of the matters in dispute with the same level of specificity as the 
Philippines’ submissions to the tribunal.   
Lastly, the tribunal turned to consider the exceptions to compulsory dispute 
settlement under Part XV of the LOSC set out in Articles 297 and 298. It decided that 
in respect of eight of the Philippines’ 15 submissions, the possible application of those 
articles was interwoven with the merits and therefore did not possess an exclusively 
preliminary character. Accordingly, it would be deferred to the merits phase of the 
case.  
Award on the merits 
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The tribunal delivered its award on the merits on 12 July 2016.13 The online version 
of the award runs to nearly 500 pages. For reasons of space, only the baldest summary 
of its findings can be given here. The award includes extensive treatment of several 
important issues in the law of the sea never previously considered, or considered in 
depth, by international courts: the overview of the award that follows focuses on those 
aspects. The award groups the substantive issues discussed into four main categories: 
(1) China’s nine-dash line and claim to historic rights in the South China Sea; (2) the
status of various maritime features; (3) the legality of certain Chinese activities in the 
South China Sea; and (4) aggravation and extension of the disputes after the 
commencement of arbitration proceedings. In the course of addressing those issues, 
the tribunal also dealt with the outstanding questions of jurisdiction from its first 
award.  
The tribunal began by considering China’s claimed historic rights. Article 298 
allows a State party to make a declaration excluding the application to it of the 
LOSC’s compulsory dispute settlement procedures in relation to disputes concerning, 
inter alia, “historic bays or titles.” China has made such a declaration. A crucial 
question, therefore, was whether China’s claims in the South China Sea, in particular 
its nine-dash line, amounted to a claim to “historic title”. The tribunal considered that 
term to refer to “claims of sovereignty over maritime areas derived from historical 
circumstances” (para. 226), which were “typically exercised either as a claim to 
internal waters or as a claim to the territorial sea” (para. 225). “Historic title” was to 
be contrasted with “historic rights”, which “describe any rights that a State may 
13 South China Sea case (Philippines v. China), Award, 12 July 2016, available at 
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2086; accessed 26 July 2017. For comment see, inter alia, S 
Kopela, ‘Historic Titles and Historic Rights in the Law of the Sea in the Light of the South China Sea 
Arbitration’ (2017) 48(2) ODIL 181-207; S Talmon, ‘The South China Sea Arbitration and the Finality 
of “Final” Awards’ (2017) 8(2) Journal of International Dispute Settlement 388-401; and several posts 
on the EJILTalk! and KG Jebsen Centre for the Law of the Sea (JCLOS) blogs.   
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possess that would not normally arise under the general rules of international law, 
absent particular historical circumstances” (para. 225). The tribunal then applied those 
conclusions to China’s claims in the South China Sea. It noted that the nine-dash line, 
which is a U-shaped line extending from China’s coast southwards so as to enclose a 
large part of the South China Sea and passes with 200 nm of the Philippines and other 
States bordering the Sea, first appeared on official Chinese maps in 1948. The tribunal 
noted various statements by China that speak (in English translation) of China’s 
sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and “adjacent waters” and 
“sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters” being “supported by 
abundant historical and legal evidence”, and of China’s “sovereignty and relevant 
rights” being “formed through the long course of history.”14  Those and similar 
statements, as well as China’s conduct, did not appear to treat the area within the 
nine-dash line as part of China’s internal waters or territorial sea. The tribunal 
therefore concluded that China’s claim in the South China Sea was one of historic 
rights rather than historic title. Thus, Article 298 did not apply and, accordingly, the 
tribunal had jurisdiction to consider the validity of China’s claimed historic rights. 
The tribunal reached that conclusion notwithstanding the fact that in 2011 China sent 
the UN a note verbale that referred to “waters of which China has historic titles 
including sovereign rights and jurisdiction” (emphasis added). In the tribunal’s view 
that statement was “at odds with the vast majority of China’s statements, however, 
and the Tribunal considers that it more likely represents an error in translation or an 
instance of imprecise drafting, rather than a claim by China to sovereignty over the 
entirety of the South China Sea” (para. 227). It is perhaps unfortunate that this aspect 
of the tribunal’s jurisdiction hangs on English translations of the original Chinese that 
14 See the materials quoted in paras. 185 and 200 of the Award. 
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may or may not accurately reflect China’s position. Had China participated in the 
proceedings, there might have been a different outcome. 
As for the nature of China’s claimed historic rights, the tribunal considered 
that they related to the exploitation of the living and non-living resources in the waters 
of the South China Sea within the nine-dash line. Insofar as those rights were claimed 
within the EEZs of other States, they were incompatible with the LOSC. From the text 
and negotiating history of the LOSC, it was clear that the LOSC did not intend to 
allow the preservation of historic rights of other States in the EEZ. In any case 
Chinese activities in the South China Sea before the entry into force of the LOSC 
were simply exercises of its high seas freedoms and therefore could not create historic 
rights.  
Following its examination of historic rights and titles, the tribunal turned to 
consider the legal status of various maritime features in the South China Sea, most of 
which lie in the Spratly Islands group. In particular, the tribunal considered whether 
they were low-tide elevations within the meaning of Article 13 of the LOSC, in which 
case they generated no territorial sea or other maritime zones; whether they were 
“rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own” within 
the meaning of Article 121(3) of the LOSC, in which case they had a territorial sea 
but no EEZ or continental shelf; or whether they were islands other than Article 
121(3)-type rocks, in which case they generated a full suite of maritime zones.    
The tribunal found that Subi Reef, Gaven Reef (South), Hughes Reef, 
Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal were all low-tide elevations within the 
meaning of Article 13. That was not so, notwithstanding the fact that as a result of 
land reclamation activities by China, some of those features were now above water at 
high tide. According to the tribunal, it was the situation of the feature in its natural 
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state that was determinative of its status: “[human] modification cannot change . . . a 
low-tide elevation into an island” (para. 305). In addition, the tribunal followed the 
ICJ by holding that a low-tide elevation could not be appropriated, although a coastal 
State had sovereignty over low-tide elevations situated in its territorial sea.   
Next the tribunal turned to consider whether any of the maritime features 
concerned were Article 121(3)-type rocks. In the past when international courts and 
tribunals have been faced with the question of whether a particular maritime feature 
was such a rock, they have avoided the issue and refrained from attempting to 
interpret the imprecise wording of Article 121(3). In the present case the tribunal 
confronts the issue head on and engages in a very lengthy and detailed interpretation 
of Article 121(3), running to nearly 30 pages, with its findings summarised as nine 
conclusions (paras. 540-8). For reasons of space, it is impossible to say more here 
about the tribunal’s interpretation other than that it is the most authoritative 
interpretation of Article 121(3) that exists, although not uncontroversial.15 Applying 
its interpretation to the maritime features at issue, the tribunal ruled that Scarborough 
Shoal, Gavan Reef (North), McKennan Reef, Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery 
Cross Reef and all other features in the Spratly Islands above water at high tide were 
all Article 121(3)-type rocks. While a number of those features had persons living on 
them, such habitation was dependent on outside resources and support. A number of 
the features had been modified to improve their habitability, including through land 
reclamation and the construction of infrastructure such as desalination plants. Those 
facts did not establish the capacity of those features in their natural condition to 
support a stable community of people, nor was there any historical evidence that those 
15 For a particularly critical view, see AG Oude Elferink, ‘The South China Sea Arbitration’s 
Interpretation of Article 121(3) of the LOSC: A Disquieting First’, JCLOS blog, available at 
http://site.uit.no/jclos/category/islands/; accessed 15 August 2015.  
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features had supported such communities in the past. Thus, they did not fall outside 
Article 121(3). 
China’s position paper (referred to earlier) appeared to suggest that the Spratly 
Islands could be enclosed by a system of archipelagic or straight baselines. The 
tribunal rejected that possibility. Archipelagic baselines could only be drawn by an 
archipelagic State, and China was not an archipelagic State. Nor, if the Philippines 
had sovereignty over the Spratly Islands, would it be able to draw archipelagic 
baselines as they could not meet the requirement that the ratio of water to land within 
those baselines must not exceed 9 to 1. Nor could straight baselines under Article 7 of 
the LOSC be utilised because the circumstances in which they may be drawn, namely 
where coasts are deeply indented or fringed with islands, “do not include the situation 
of an offshore archipelago” (para. 575). While there was some contrary State practice, 
that was not sufficient to give rise to a new rule of customary international law. The 
tribunal thus emphatically rejected the assertion of some commentators that there is an 
emerging rule of customary international law that permits straight baselines to be 
drawn around the archipelagos of non-archipelagic States.    
 As noted above, the tribunal found that Mischief Reef and Second Thomas 
Shoal were low-tide elevations. As they did not lie within any of the maritime zones 
of the islands claimed by China but were situated within 200 nm of the Philippines’ 
archipelagic baselines, they fell within the Philippines’ EEZ. The tribunal accepted 
that China considered in good faith that it had rights in this area. Diplomatic 
communications asserting those rights did not breach the LOSC. The position was 
different, however, in relation to actions going beyond such communications: they 
breached the continental shelf and EEZ rights of the Philippines. Specifically, the 
tribunal found that China had breached the Philippines’ rights under Article 77 of the 
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LOSC by its marine surveillance vessels ordering a ship carrying out seismic 
surveying for the Philippines to halt operations; breached Article 56 by adopting a 
moratorium on fishing in an area that included the Philippines’ EEZ and applied not 
only to Chinese vessels; breached Article 58(3) to have due regard to the fisheries 
rights of the Philippines in its (the Philippines’) EEZ by not exercising due diligence 
to prevent its fishermen from fishing there;16 and breached Articles 60 and 80 by 
constructing installations and artificial islands at Mischief Reef without the 
authorization of the Philippines.     
The tribunal also assessed the legality of a number of other acts by China. It 
found that China had “unlawfully prevented Filipino fishermen from engaging in 
traditional fishing” in the territorial sea around Scarborough Shoal (para. 814), a 
finding that did not depend on which State had sovereignty over the Shoal. Fishermen 
from the Philippines, as well as China and Vietnam, had acquired traditional fishing 
rights in that area. The legal basis for protecting those rights “stems from the notion of 
vested rights and the understanding that, having pursued a livelihood through artisanal 
fishing over an extended period, generations of fishermen have acquired a right, akin 
to property, in the ability to continue to fish in the manner of their forebears” (para. 
798). Such rights were not the historic rights of States, but private rights. The tribunal 
does not specify what provision of international law China had breached in not 
protecting those rights. The tribunal noted, but did not specifically endorse, the 
Philippines’ argument that if it (the Philippines) had sovereignty over Scarborough 
Shoal, China would have violated the Philippines’ territorial sea rights under the 
LOSC; and if China had sovereignty, it would have violated its obligation under 
16 On the obligation of due regard, the tribunal follows the Chagos MPA case (discussed above); on that 
of due diligence it follows the ITLOS 2015 advisory opinion on fisheries.
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Article 2(3) of the LOSC to exercise its sovereignty subject to other rules of 
international law. The tribunal did, however, agree with the Chagos MPA case on the 
nature of the obligation under Article 2(3), and observed that “other rules of 
international law” included traditional fishing rights.   
The tribunal turned next to consider the compatibility of various Chinese 
activities with the environmental provisions of the LOSC. It found that China had 
violated Articles 192 and 194(5) by failing to exercise due diligence to prevent its 
vessels from harvesting endangered species (including coral, turtles, sharks and giant 
clams) on a significant scale and from harvesting giant clams by using their propellers 
to break up coral, which was seriously destructive of the coral reef ecosystem. The 
present case is the first in which an international judicial body has considered the 
scope of Article 192, which provides simply that “States have the obligation to protect 
and preserve the marine environment.” The tribunal rejected the view of some 
commentators that the article is purely hortatory. On the contrary, “Article 192 does 
impose a duty on States Parties, the content of which is informed by the other 
provisions of Part XII and other applicable rules of international law. This ‘general 
obligation’ extends both to ‘protection’ of the marine environment from future 
damage and ‘preservation’ in the sense of maintaining or improving its present 
condition. Article 192 thus entails the positive obligation to take active measures to 
protect and preserve the marine environment, and by logical implication, entails the 
negative obligation not to degrade the marine environment . . . The content of the 
general obligation in Article 192 is further detailed in the subsequent provisions of 
Part XII, including Article 194, as well as by reference to specific obligations set out 
in other international agreements” (paras. 941-2). In relation to non-State actors, there 
is an obligation on States to exercise due diligence to prevent their nationals from 
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violating Article 192 and 194(5) (see paras. 944, 956 and 959). In addition to the 
violations already described, the tribunal found that China had also violated Articles 
192 and 194(5), as well as Articles 123 (on cooperation in semi-enclosed seas), 
194(1) (on harmonisation of pollution policies), 197 (on cooperation on 
environmental protection) and 206 (on the communication of environmental impact 
assessments), by causing “devastating and long-lasting damage to the marine 
environment” of seven coral reefs in the Spratly Islands by its land reclamation and 
construction activities (para. 983). In making that assessment, the tribunal was aided 
by the reports of three experts on coral reefs whom it had appointed 
 The final Chinese activity whose legality was assessed by the tribunal was 
alleged dangerous manoeuvring by Chinese law enforcement vessels on two 
occasions in 2012 near Scarborough Shoal, which had created a serious risk of 
collision with Philippine vessels. With the assistance of an expert on navigational 
safety whom it had appointed, the tribunal found that the Chinese vessels had 
contravened several of the provisions of the Convention on the International 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972. The Convention was one of the 
“generally accepted international regulations” referred to in Article 94(5) of the 
LOSC, to which States parties are required to “conform”. Accordingly, China had 
breached Article 94.     
 That left one remaining issue: whether China’s activities during the time that 
the arbitration was in progress had aggravated or extended the dispute. The tribunal 
found there was an obligation on the parties to a dispute not to take any steps that 
would aggravate or extend the dispute while dispute settlement proceedings were 
ongoing, an obligation that existed independently of any order made by a court (such 
as a provisional measure). That obligation “stems from the purpose of dispute 
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settlement” (para. 1169) and is “inherent in the central role of good faith in the 
international legal relations between States” (para. 1171). Moreover, the obligation 
found expression in the LOSC, in Articles 279 (which requires States to settle 
disputes by peaceful means), 300 (which requires States to fulfil their LOSC 
obligations in good faith) and 296 (which provides that decisions of LOSC dispute 
settlement bodies are final and binding). The tribunal found that during the period that 
the arbitration had been ongoing, China had violated those three provisions by 
constructing a large artificial island on Mischief Reef, by causing permanent and 
irreparable harm to the coral reef ecosystem of that and other reefs, and by 
permanently destroying evidence of the natural conditions of those reefs through its 
land reclamation and construction activities, thus having made it harder for the 
tribunal to determine their legal status and maritime entitlements. This is the first 
occasion on which a LOSC dispute settlement body has found a breach of Article 300. 
On the other hand, the tribunal found that it lacked the jurisdiction to rule on whether 
interactions between Chinese and Philippine military personnel at Second Thomas 
Shoal had aggravated the dispute because of China’s declaration under Article 298 
excluding military activities from compulsory dispute settlement. 
Overall, the tribunal upheld, in whole or in part, all but one of the Philippines’ 
15 submissions. The exception was a request for the tribunal to rule that China should 
comply with its LOSC obligations in future. Since there was no dispute between the 
parties over this, the tribunal found it unnecessary to make a ruling. Not surprisingly, 
China announced that it would not accept the tribunal’s award.17             
17 Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China on the Award of 12 
July 2016 of the Arbitral Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration Established at the Request of the 
Republic of the Philippines, 12 July 2016, available at 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1379492.shtml; accessed 8 January 2017.   
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Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Netherlands v. Russia) 
This case concerns the seizure and detention by Russia of a Netherlands-registered 
ship, the Arctic Sunrise, and all those on board in September 2013, following a protest 
by members of Greenpeace against Russian oil activities in the Arctic that had 
included attempts to board a Russian oil platform in Russia’s EEZ in the Pechora Sea. 
On 4 October 2013 the Netherlands instituted arbitral proceedings against Russia 
under Annex VII of the LOSC, claiming that Russia’s seizure and detention of the 
Arctic Sunrise and those on board (whom the tribunal consistently refers to as the 
“Arctic 30”) breached Articles 56, 58, 60 and 87 of the LOSC, as well as Articles 9 
and 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). At the 
same time it applied to the ITLOS for an order of provisional measures, requesting the 
release the Arctic Sunrise and the Arctic 30. The ITLOS made an order to that effect 
on 22 October 2013. In December 2013 Russia released those members of the Arctic 
30 who were not Russian nationals as part of a general amnesty. The Arctic Sunrise 
itself was allowed to leave the port of Murmansk on 1 August 2014.  
In the meantime the arbitration proceedings continued. Like China in the 
South China Sea case, Russia declined to take part in the proceedings, including the 
nomination of an arbitrator. As a result, the arbitral tribunal was, with the exception of 
the Netherlands-nominated arbitrator, appointed by the President of the ITLOS and 
comprised Judge Thomas Mensah (president), Professor Alfred Soons (nominated by 
the Netherlands), Dr Alberto Székely, Mr Henry Burmester and Professor Janusz 
Symonides. Although not participating in the tribunal, Russia wrote to the tribunal 
asserting that it lacked jurisdiction because of Russia’s declaration under Article 298 
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of the LOSC. On 26 November 2014 the tribunal delivered an award on that matter, 
rejecting Russia’s assertion.18  
On 14 August 2015 the tribunal delivered its award on the remaining issues of 
jurisdiction and on the merits.19 On jurisdiction, the tribunal considered two principal 
matters – whether there had been the exchange of views between the parties regarding 
the means of settling their dispute required by Article 283, and the Netherlands’ 
standing to bring the case. On the exchange of views, the tribunal found that the only 
communication between the parties concerning the means of settling the dispute was a 
note verbale sent by the Netherlands to Russia on 3 October 2013 in which it stated 
that “there seems to be merit in submitting this dispute to arbitration” under the LOSC 
and that it “is considering initiating such arbitration as soon as feasible.” The tribunal 
considered that this sufficed as an exchange of views for the purpose of Article 283, 
even though, as it acknowledged, this was “brief, one-sided (in the sense that Russia 
did not make any counter-proposal or accept the proposal to arbitrate) and took place 
only a day before the commencement of arbitration. Such an exchange of views may 
not suffice in every case” (para. 153). It sufficed in the present case because of “the 
urgency, from the perspective of the Netherlands, of securing the release of the Arctic 
Sunrise and its crew” (para. 154). That appears almost to presuppose that Russia’s 
seizure and detention of the ship were illegal.  
18 In the Matter of the Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Netherlands v. Russia), Award on Jurisdiction, 26 
November 2014, available at http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1325; accessed 3 October 
2016.  
19 In the Matter of the Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Netherlands v. Russia), Award on the Merits, 14 
August 2015, available at http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1438; accessed 3 October 2016. 
For comment see, inter alia, AG Oude Elferink, ‘The Russian Federation and the Arctic Sunrise Case: 
Hot Pursuit and Other Issues under the LOSC’ (2016) 92 International Law Studies 381-406; J 
Harrison, ‘Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Netherlands v. Russia). Background to the Arbitral Proceedings’ 
(2016) 31 IJMCL 145-57; and J Mossop, ‘Protests against Oil Exploration at Sea: Lessons from the 
Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (2016) 31 IJMCL 60-87. 
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Regrettably, and unlike the tribunal in the South China Sea case, the tribunal 
made no reference to Article 286, which provides that unilateral resort to the binding 
means of settlement under section 2 of Part XV may only be made “where no 
settlement has been reached by recourse to section 1” of Part XV. It is difficult to see 
in the present case that any attempt had been made to settle the dispute under section 
1 of Part XV, especially given the limited time between the dispute arising and its 
submission to arbitration. The tribunal did not, in fact, consider at what point in time 
the dispute arose. The earliest that the dispute could have arisen was 29 September 
2013, when the Netherlands first protested the seizure of the Arctic Sunrise. More 
likely, it was on 3 October, when the Netherlands informed Russia that it disagreed 
with the latter’s interpretation of the LOSC.20 Thus, there was either one day, or at 
most five days, between the dispute arising and the initiation of arbitral proceedings. 
It is difficult to see how in either time frame there could have been a meaningful 
attempt to settle the dispute in accordance with section 1 of Part XV.  
As regards the question of standing, the tribunal held that the Netherlands had 
standing, as the flag State of the Arctic Sunrise, to bring claims as regards alleged 
breaches of obligations of international law owed to it by Russia. Applying the “ship 
as a unit doctrine” referred to when discussing the Norstar case above, the tribunal 
held that the Netherlands also had standing to bring “claims in respect of alleged 
violations of its rights under the Convention which resulted in injury or damage to the 
ship, all persons and objects and persons on board, as well as the owner” (para. 172). 
“As [those] claims are direct claims brought by the Netherlands against Russia . . . the 
                                                 
20 In his dissenting opinion in the provisional measures phase of the case, Judge Golitsyn considered 
that the dispute arose on 3 October: see The “Arctic Sunrise” Case (Kingdom of the Netherlands v. 
Russian Federation) (Provisional Measures), Order of 22 November 2013, dissenting opinion of Judge 
Golitsyn para. 12, ITLOS Reports 2013, 230. The ITLOS itself did not offer a view as to when the 
dispute arose. 
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requirement for the exhaustion of local remedies is inapposite” (para. 173). It is 
questionable whether that analysis is correct. In Article 18 of its Draft Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection the International Law Commission recognises the right of a 
flag State to seek redress under the ship as a unit doctrine.21 In its commentary on 
Article 18, it states that there is “a close resemblance between this type of protection 
and diplomatic protection”, even if the two are not the same.22 Elsewhere in its Draft 
Articles, the Commission makes a distinction between “direct injuries” to a State and 
“indirect injuries” to a State. The latter situation is where the State is injured “through 
its national.”23 Given the “close resemblance” between the right of diplomatic 
protection and the right to exercise protection in respect of a ship and those on board, 
it would seem that an injury to a privately-owned ship and those on board is an 
indirect injury to the flag State, although admittedly the Commission does not actually 
say so. If that is correct, then, in accordance with Article 14(3), exhaustion of local 
remedies is required unless a State is claiming for both direct and indirect injuries and 
the former is the preponderant claim. This approach was largely adopted by the 
decision of the ITLOS in the Virginia G case.24 If this analysis is correct, the tribunal 
should have characterised the injury to the Arctic Sunrise and the Arctic 30 as an 
indirect injury to the Netherlands, and then considered which of its claims was 
preponderant.      
The tribunal dealt with the alleged breaches by Russia of the ICCPR under the 
heading of “Applicable Law.” It noted that the ICCPR “has its own enforcement 
regime and it is not for this Tribunal to act as a substitute for that regime” (para. 197). 
21 Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2006, Vol. 
II, Part 2, p. 23. 
22 Commentary on Draft Article 18, para. 1.  
23 Commentary on Draft Article 14, para. 9. 
24 Para. 157. 
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Instead, the tribunal could, if necessary, “have regard to general international law in 
relation to human rights in order to determine whether law enforcement action such as 
[that at issue in the case] was reasonable and proportionate. 
Turning to the merits, the tribunal identified four issues: (1) Russia’s 
establishment of a safety zone around the oil platform that members of the Arctic 30 
had attempted to board; (2) the lawfulness of the measures taken by Russia against the 
Arctic Sunrise and the Arctic 30; (3) Russia’s compliance with the ITLOS order of 
provisional measures; and (4) Russia’s failure to pay deposits towards the cost of the 
arbitration. As regards the first issue, the Netherlands had alleged that Russia had 
established a three nm safety zone around that platform and that this breached Article 
60 of the LOSC. The tribunal disagreed. Although ships were recommended not to 
enter the three-mile zone without the permission of the platform operator, that did not 
make the zone a safety zones within the meaning of Article 60. In accordance with 
Russian Law (and the LOSC), Russia had in fact established a safety zone of only 500 
metres in breadth. There was therefore no breach of Article 60. 
The next issue was that of the lawfulness of the seizure of the Arctic Sunrise 
and the Arctic 30. The tribunal began by observing that “[p]rotest at sea is an 
internationally lawful use of the sea related to the freedom of navigation,” as it is 
“necessarily exercised in conjunction with freedom of navigation” (para. 227). The 
right to protest derived from the freedoms of expression and assembly, both of which 
were recognised in several human rights treaties to which the Netherlands and Russia 
were parties. The right to protest at sea was, however, subject to certain limitations, in 
particular Article 88 of the LOSC, which provides that the high seas shall be reserved 
for peaceful purposes, and Article 58(2), which requires States exercising their right 
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of navigation in another State’s EEZ to have due regard to the coastal State’s rights 
and duties and to comply with its laws adopted in conformity with the LOSC. 
The tribunal then noted that under Article 92(1) of the LOSC, which applied to 
the EEZ by virtue of Article 58(2), a flag State had exclusive jurisdiction over its 
ships navigating in the EEZ of another State, subject to certain exceptions. With 
Russia absent from the proceedings, the tribunal had to examine the possible 
exceptions that might have been relied on by Russia, had it participated in the case, to 
justify its interference with the Netherlands’s exclusive flag State jurisdiction by 
boarding, seizing and detaining the Arctic Sunrise. 
A first possible justification for Russia’s actions was the right of visit on 
suspicion of piracy, provided by Article 110 of the LOSC. However, this was not 
applicable because the LOSC required a suspected pirate ship to have taken action in 
respect of another ship. Here the Arctic Sunrise had directed its acts against an oil 
platform, not another ship.    
A second possible justification was the right of hot pursuit, following violation 
of Russian laws applicable to the oil platform and its safety zone. Absent hot pursuit, 
the LOSC did not justify seizure for such violations outside the safety zone. The 
tribunal examined the requirements of hot pursuit set out in Article 111 of the LOSC. 
It found that the requirement that there be a violation of the coastal State’s laws was 
satisfied as small boats from the Arctic Sunrise had entered the safety zone around the 
platform without permission, contrary to Russian law. The tribunal also found that the 
necessary auditory signal to stop had been given. Even if that signal was given by 
VHF radio, it was an “auditory signal” for the purposes of Article 111: that provision 
had to be interpreted in the light of its object and purpose, “having regard to the 
modern use of technology” (para. 259). As regards the requirement that hot pursuit 
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must be commenced “when the foreign ship or, in the application of the doctrine of 
constructive presence incorporated in Article 111(4), its boats or other craft working 
as a team and using the pursued ship as a mother ship, are within the relevant area” 
(para. 253), that requirement should be determined not “with the benefit of hindsight, 
but rather looked at from the perspective of the pursuing ship” (para. 267). On that 
basis, the requirement was satisfied. However, the requirement that pursuit be 
continuous, i.e. not interrupted between the first signal to stop being given and a ship 
being boarded, was not satisfied in this case. Thus, Russia could not justify its seizure 
of the Arctic Sunrise on the basis of hot pursuit.      
A possible alternative justification was as a response to the commission of a 
terrorist offence in the safety zone. While a coastal State was entitled to seize a ship 
within the safety zone for such an offence, there was no right to do so in the EEZ 
“where such action would not otherwise be authorised by the [Law of the Sea] 
Convention” (para. 278). The only example that the tribunal gives of such possible 
authorisation is hot pursuit. Later in its award, the tribunal considered the preventive 
powers of the coastal State in relation to terrorist offences in its EEZ. It observed that 
the coastal State would be able to take preventive action against a terrorist attack on 
an installation because that would involve a direct interference with the exercise of a 
coastal State’s sovereign rights to exploit the non-living resources of its seabed. 
However, it was not necessary for the tribunal to “determine the extent of any power 
to take such preventive action” as “there was no reasonable basis for Russia to suspect 
that the Arctic Sunrise was engaged or likely to engage in terrorist acts” (para. 314).  
Next the tribunal turned to the right of a coastal State to enforce its laws 
regarding non-living resources in the EEZ as a possible justification for Russia’s 
actions. The tribunal noted that the LOSC gave the coastal State no explicit powers in 
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that regard. However, the provisions in the LOSC on a coastal State’s sovereign rights 
over non-living resources largely derived from the 1958 Convention on the 
Continental Shelf. In its commentary on the draft articles that formed the basis of that 
Convention, the International Law Commission had observed that a coastal State’s 
sovereign rights included jurisdiction in connection with the prevention and 
punishment of violations of its laws. That led the tribunal to observe that while it 
“does not find it necessary to reach a view on the extent of the coastal State’s right to 
enforce its laws in relation to the non-living resources in the EEZ, it is clear that such 
a right exists” (para. 284). However, in the present case there was no evidence that the 
Arctic Sunrise had breached Russia’s laws other than in the safety zone. Elsewhere in 
its award the tribunal concludes that a coastal State also has the right to take 
“appropriate” measures to prevent interference with its sovereign rights, provided 
such measures “fulfil the tests of reasonableness, necessity and proportionality” (para. 
326). Such measures could include those necessary to prevent violations of the coastal 
State’s laws, dangerous situations, “negative environmental consequences”, and delay 
or interruption to essential operations (para. 327). “At the same time the coastal State 
should tolerate some level of nuisance through civilian protest as long as it does not 
amount to an ‘interference with the exercise of its sovereign rights’. Due regard must 
be given to rights of other States, including the right to allow vessels flying their flag 
to protest” (para. 328). In the present case the Arctic Sunrise was, at the time of its 
seizure, no longer engaged in actions that could potentially interfere with the exercise 
by Russia of its sovereign rights, nor did the Russian authorities give that as their 
reason for the seizure. Had they done so, their actions would not have been justified, 
as they would have infringed the Netherlands’ freedom of navigation contrary to 
Article 78(2) of the LOSC. The award is not overly clear on how the preventive 
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powers of a coastal State in relation to its rights over the non-living resources of the 
seabed are to be balanced against the right of other States to protest, in particular as 
regards the dividing line between acts of “nuisance” by a ship (which are lawful) and 
acts amounting to “interference” (which are not).      
A further possible justification for Russia’s seizure and detention of the Arctic 
Sunrise could have been the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction in relation to the 
marine environment. The tribunal examines various provisions of the LOSC in this 
regard. Article 220 was not relevant as there was no evidence that the Arctic Sunrise 
had violated applicable international rules and standards relating to vessel-source 
pollution. Nor were the conditions for a coastal State to take preventive action against 
maritime casualties under Article 221 casualties satisfied. While Russia had adopted 
laws relating to pollution in ice-covered areas under Article 234 of the LOSC, those 
laws did not apply in the area where the Arctic Sunrise was seized.  
The final possible justification for Russia’s seizure of the Arctic Sunrise might 
have been because of its alleged dangerous manoeuvring. However, seizure for that 
reason would not have been justified because under Article 97 of the LOSC, which 
the tribunal assumes (reasonably, it would seem) applies in the EEZ by virtue of 
Article 58(2), arrest or detention of a ship following an “incident of navigation” is 
reserved to the flag State.              
Thus, the tribunal concluded that none of the possible grounds discussed 
above could justify Russia’s boarding, seizure and detention of the Arctic Sunrise. 
Russia had therefore breached its obligations under Article 56, 58, 87 and 92 of the 
LOSC that it owed to the Netherlands “as a flag State exercising exclusive jurisdiction 
over the Arctic Sunrise in Russia’s EEZ” (para. 333). 
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The tribunal then turned to deal with the Netherlands’ claim that Russia had 
not complied with the provisional measures order made by the ITLOS. It found that 
Russia had failed to comply by not allowing the Arctic 30 to leave Russia sufficiently 
promptly following their release from custody and by not releasing the Arctic Sunrise 
until six months after the ITLOS order. Russia also failed to submit the report 
required by that order.    
The final issue was Russia’s failure to pay deposits requested by the tribunal 
to cover its costs. While there was no express obligation in the LOSC, “[a] 
requirement to make such deposits must be regarded as inherent in the obligations 
under Part XV and Annex VII” of the LOSC (para. 367). The tribunal therefore 
ordered Russia to reimburse the Netherlands for having paid Russia’s share of the 
deposits when that had not been forthcoming.  
Having found various breaches of the LOSC, the tribunal was left with the 
question of reparation. It decided that it was unnecessary to accede to the 
Netherlands’ request that it order Russia to issue a formal apology for its actions or 
provide assurances of non-repetition: a declaration finding various breaches of the 
LOSC by Russia was sufficient. The tribunal did, however, order Russia to return 
various objects belonging to the Arctic Sunrise and some personal belongings of the 
Arctic 30 that Russia had retained. The tribunal also decided that the Netherlands was 
entitled to compensation for damage to the Arctic Sunrise, the wrongful arrest and 
detention of the Arctic 30, its payment of Russia’s share of the deposits, and its costs 
in issuing a bank guarantee further to the provisional measures of the ITLOS. The 
tribunal reserved the amount of such compensation for further decision. No such 
decision had been given as at the end of 2016.    
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The Duzgit Integrity Arbitration (Malta v. São Tomé and Príncipe) 
This case concerns the seizure, detention, and penalisation of the Duzgit Integrity, a 
Maltese-registered tanker, and its master by São Tomé and Príncipe (STP), following 
the tanker’s involvement in an allegedly unauthorised ship-to-ship (STS) transfer of 
oil that took place in STP’s archipelagic waters in March 2013. Following 
unsuccessful attempts to resolve a dispute over the legality of STP’s actions, Malta 
instituted arbitral proceedings against STP on 22 October 2013, alleging that in 
seizing, detaining and penalising the Duzgit Integrity STP had violated Articles 2(3), 
25(1), 49(3) and 300 of the LOSC, and that in ordering a subsequent transfer of oil 
from the ship, it had violated Articles 192, 194, 225 and 300. The tribunal appointed 
to hear the case comprised three arbitrators rather than the five stipulated by Annex 
VII, presumably for reasons of cost. The three were Professor Alfred Soons 
(president), Professor Tullio Treves and Judge James Kateka. The tribunal delivered 
its award on 5 September 2016.25  
STP raised objections of jurisdiction and admissibility to the proceedings. Its 
jurisdictional objection was that there was no dispute concerning the interpretation 
and application of the LOSC. The tribunal readily disposed of that objection, noting 
that the dispute was about the confines of STP’s enforcement jurisdiction under the 
LOSC.  
STP’s objections of admissibility were more substantial. Its first was that there 
had been no exhaustion of local remedies, as required by Article 295 of the LOSC. As 
already seen, this issue also arose in the Norstar and Arctic Sunrise cases. In the 
25 The Duzgit Integrity Arbitration (Malta v. São Tomé and Príncipe), Award, 5 September 2016, 
available at http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1915; accessed 3 October 2016. 
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present case the tribunal’s approach is much more satisfactory. While Malta had 
characterised its claim as one of diplomatic protection, it had also invoked its rights as 
a flag State under the LOSC. For Malta to have standing in the latter situation, the 
tribunal needed only to be satisfied that obligations were owed by STP to Malta under 
the LOSC. That was the case here. Pursuant to Articles 49(3) and 300, STP had to 
ensure that any law enforcement measures taken by it against a vessel under Malta’s 
flag in STP’s archipelagic waters complied with the LOSC. As for Malta’s right to 
bring a claim for possible indirect injury, the tribunal accepted the ship as a unit 
doctrine. The question then was which of Malta’s claims was preponderant, that 
regarding its direct rights or that of its indirect rights. If the latter, the exhaustion of 
local remedies would be required. While it was often difficult to decide which claim 
was preponderant in mixed claims, the position in this case was straightforward as the 
owner of the Duzgit Integrity had concluded a settlement agreement with STP 
waiving any claims against it. Thus, Malta’s claim for direct injuries was 
preponderant. STP’s other objections of admissibility were dismissed more rapidly by 
the tribunal. It rejected arguments that Malta had not specified the legal bases of its 
claims sufficiently, that the settlement agreement between STP and DS Tankers 
precluded Malta from bringing the case, and that the requirements of Article 283 had 
not been satisfied. 
Before addressing the merits, the tribunal noted that Malta had argued that 
STP’s conduct relating to the seizure and detention of the Duzgit Integrity had not 
complied with basic human rights norms. The tribunal followed the award in the 
Arctic Sunrise case closely in its view of the relevance of such norms. It also observed 
that “the exercise of [law] enforcement powers by a (coastal) State in situations where 
the State derives these powers from provisions of the [LOS] Convention is also 
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governed by certain rules and principles of general international law, in particular the 
principle of reasonableness. This principle encompasses the principles of necessity 
and proportionality” (para. 209).  
 The tribunal then turned to address the merits. There were two distinct claims 
by Malta to be considered. The first was that in seizing and detaining the Duzgit 
Integrity and penalising the vessel and its master, STP had violated various provisions 
of the LOSC. The tribunal began with Article 49(3), which provides that an 
archipelagic State’s sovereignty over its archipelagic waters “is exercised subject to 
this Part”, i.e. Part IV, headed “Archipelagic States”. The tribunal found that Malta 
had failed to establish that the Duzgit Integrity had the authorization required under 
STP’s law for a STS transfer of oil and which STP was entitled to require by virtue of 
its sovereignty over archipelagic waters. The tribunal therefore ruled that STP was 
justified in seizing the Duzgit Integrity in order to ensure compliance with its laws. 
STP was likewise entitled to detain the Duzgit Integrity and fine its master: that fine 
was reasonable and proportionate. However, the other penalties imposed by STP 
(which included prolonged detention of the vessel and its master, further fines and 
confiscation of the cargo), when taken together, were unreasonable and 
disproportionate in relation to the offence committed by the Duzgit Integrity. The 
tribunal therefore held, Judge Kateka dissenting, that STP had violated Article 49(3) 
of the LOSC. Judge Kateka disagreed. In his view the tribunal had been wrong to treat 
the various penalties imposed cumulatively, rather than assessing the reasonableness 
of each penalty individually. Furthermore, the tribunal had paid insufficient attention 
to the particular circumstances of the case, which included the prevalence of illegal 
STS transfers and bunkering in West African waters, which fuelled IUU fishing, as 
well as STP’s lack of at-sea enforcement capability.  
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The tribunal dealt swiftly with the other provisions of the LOSC invoked by 
Malta in its first claim. It ruled that it was unnecessary to determine whether there had 
been a violation of Article 300. Article 2(3), which applies to the territorial sea, was 
not relevant because at the time when the Duzgit Integrity was seized, it was in STP’s 
archipelagic waters. Although Article 25(1) is located in Part II on the territorial sea, 
it also applies to archipelagic waters by virtue of Article 52(1). Nevertheless, it was 
not relevant because it dealt with ships in innocent passage, whereas at the time of its 
seizure the Duzgit Integrity, being engaged in a STS transfer of oil, was not in 
passage.    
The tribunal also summarily dismissed Malta’s second claim, that in ordering 
a transfer of oil from the Duzgit Integrity to another ship, STP had violated Articles 
192, 194, 225 and 300 of the LOSC. Based on the evidence before it, the tribunal was 
not persuaded that STP had exposed the marine environment to an unreasonable risk 
in breach of Article 225 (and presumably also of Articles 192 and 194, although the 
tribunal does not mention them explicitly). 
Overall, therefore, the tribunal found that the only provision of the LOSC that 
STP had violated was Article 49(3). As regards reparation for this breach, the tribunal 
decided (Judge Kateka dissenting) that “Malta is entitled to proceed in a further phase 
of these proceedings to claim damages in respect of [various] heads of claim to the 
extent that it can establish causation between the loss and São Tomé’s unlawful 
conduct” (para. 333). As at the end of 2016, this further phase of proceedings had not 
taken place.  
The “Enrica Lexie” Incident Arbitration (Italy v. India)  
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On 26 June 2015 Italy initiated arbitration proceedings under Annex VII against India 
in relation to an incident that occurred in February 2012.26 The parties differ sharply 
in their accounts of that incident. According to Italy, the Enrica Lexie, an oil tanker 
flying its flag, was 20.5 nm off the coast of southern India (i.e. in India’s EEZ) en 
route from Sri Lanka to Djibouti when an unidentified craft was observed heading 
rapidly towards it. Two Italian marines on board thought that it was a pirate attack and 
fired warning shots. Eventually the craft turned away and headed towards the open 
sea. According to India, two fishermen had been shot and killed on an Indian fishing 
boat and the Enrica Lexie was considered responsible. Indian authorities instructed 
the Enrica Lexie to sail to the Indian port of Kochi where it was boarded and the two 
marines arrested. In its statement of claim, Italy argued that India had violated 
Articles 2(3), 27, 33, 56, 58, 87, 89, 92, 94, 97, 100 and 300 of the LOSC by 
exercising jurisdiction over the Enrica Lexie and the two marines and by failing to 
cooperate in the repression of piracy.  
Italy appointed Professor Francesco Francioni as an arbitrator and India 
appointed Judge Chandrasekhara Rao (a member of the ITLOS). The parties were 
unable to agree on the appointment of the remaining three arbitrators. In accordance 
with Article 3(e) of Annex VII of the LOSC, the President of the ITLOS appointed as 
arbitrators Judge Paik (a member of the ITLOS), Judge Robinson (a member of the 
ICJ) and Judge Golitsyn (the incoming president of the ITLOS), with Judge Golitsyn 
to serve as president of the arbitral tribunal.27  
                                                 
26 Italy’s notification and statement of claim are available at 
http://www.pcacases.com/pcadocs/Notification/Italys%20Notification%20(Redacted).pdf; accessed 10 
June 2016. 
27 PCA Press Release of 6 November 2015, available at 
http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1515; accessed 10 June 2016. 
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On 21 July 2015 Italy requested the ITLOS to make an order of provisional 
measures under Article 290(5) of the LOSC requiring India to refrain from taking any 
judicial or administrative measures against the two marines and to lift all restrictions 
on their liberty so as to allow one of the marines (Sergeant Girone), who was detained 
in India, to return to Italy and the other marine, who had returned to Italy on grounds 
of ill health, to remain there during the arbitral proceedings. The ITLOS made an 
order of provisional on 24 August 2015.28 It decided not to prescribe the measures 
requested by Italy, but instead prescribed a measure of its own, ordering Italy and 
India to suspend all court proceedings and refrain from initiating any new ones that 
might aggravate the dispute or that might jeopardize the carrying out of any decision 
that the arbitral tribunal might render.     
Notwithstanding that order, Italy made an application to the arbitral tribunal 
for a further provisional measure on 11 December 2015, requesting it to order India to 
relax the bail conditions of Girone in order to enable him to return to Italy pending the 
decision of the tribunal on the merits of the case. The tribunal made an order in 
response to this request on 29 April 2016.29 Article 290(1) requires two conditions to 
be satisfied before the court or tribunal hearing a case may make an order of 
provisional measures: first, it must be satisfied that prima facie it has jurisdiction, and, 
second, that provisional measures are appropriate to preserve the respective rights of 
28 The “Enrica Lexie” Incident (Italy v. India), Request for the Prescription of Provisional Measures, 
Order of 24 August 2015, available at 
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.24_prov_meas/C24_Order_24.08.2015_
orig_Eng.pdf; accessed 14 October 2016. The Order is discussed in the previous Survey: see R 
Churchill, ‘Dispute Settlement in the Law of the Sea: Survey for 2015 – Part I’ (2016) 31 IJMCL 555-
82, at pp. 576-80. 
29 The “Enrica Lexie” Incident (Italy v. India), Request for Provisional Measures, Order of 29 April 
2016, available at http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1707; accessed 3 October 2016. For early 
comment, see N Bankes, ‘The Annex VII tribunal in the “Enrica Lexie” incident makes a new order of 
provisional measures’, JCLOS blog, available at http://site.uit.no/jclos/2016/05/12/the-annex-vii-
tribunal-in-the-enrica-lexie-incident-makes-new-provisional-measures-order/; accessed 3 October 
2016.  
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the parties. The tribunal dealt with the first condition very briefly. It considered that 
there was a dispute relating to the LOSC as Italy had alleged breaches of a variety of 
its provisions and India had contested that. That was sufficient for the tribunal to 
conclude that prima facie it had jurisdiction. This brief treatment of prima facie 
jurisdiction may be because in its order the ITLOS (of which three of the arbitrators 
are members) had already concluded that prima facie the tribunal had jurisdiction and 
because India had not contested that finding in the present case.  
Before addressing the second condition necessary for the prescription of 
provisional measures, the tribunal dealt with issues of admissibility. It found that there 
had been an exchange of views between the parties, as required by Article 283 of the 
LOSC. The next issue was whether Italy’s request was sufficiently similar to the order 
that it had sought from, but not been granted by, the ITLOS so as to render it 
inadmissible. In the tribunal’s view, Italy’s present request was different. Its request 
to the ITLOS had sought to remove Girone “entirely from the reach of India’s legal 
system”, whereas the present request recognised that should Girone be allowed to 
return to Italy, “he will remain under the jurisdiction of the courts of India” (para. 35). 
Furthermore, Italy was not seeking a revision of the provisional measure made by the 
ITLOS; thus the conditions governing such revision, set out in Article 290(2) of the 
LOSC, did not apply. Italy’s request for provisional measures was therefore 
admissible.  
A further matter dealt with by the tribunal before addressing the question of 
whether there was a need to preserve the respective rights of the parties was the 
question of urgency. Although Article 290(1) makes no reference to this question, the 
tribunal, relying on the recent jurisprudence of the ITLOS (in particular the 
Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire case) and the ICJ, considered that “a showing or urgency in 
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some form is inherent in provisional measures proceedings. Generally, urgency is 
linked to the criterion of the preservation of the respective rights of the parties to the 
dispute in order to avert a real and imminent risk that irreparable prejudice may be 
caused to the rights at issue” (para. 89). In the present case, such a link “is particularly 
pronounced” (ibid.).  
That then led on to consideration of the respective rights of the parties. The 
tribunal noted that although Girone was living at the residence of the Italian 
ambassador in India and thus able to receive visits from members of his family, the 
sporadic contact meant that his children were suffering. That raised “considerations of 
humanity” that the tribunal should seek to “give effect to”, while preserving the 
respective rights of the parties (para. 106). The tribunal therefore “considers that the 
rights of both Parties could be appropriately preserved by alleviating Sergeant 
Girone’s bail conditions so as to allow him to spend the time of his bail in Italy 
pending a final decision in this case” (para. 107). One might conclude from that 
observation that the tribunal would order India to allow Girone to return to Italy. In 
fact, the tribunal did not do so. Instead, it put the ball back in the parties’ court, 
unanimously ordering them to cooperate “to achieve a relaxation of the bail 
conditions of Sergeant Girone so as to give effect to the concept of considerations of 
humanity”, in order that Girone might return to Italy during the arbitration 
proceedings (para. 132(a)). If that happened, Italy would be under an obligation to 
return Girone should the tribunal find that India had jurisdiction over him. This rather 
unsatisfactory outcome is compounded by the fact that the tribunal never clearly 
identified the respective rights of the parties that it was supposed to be preserving, 
nor, seemingly, did it take much account to the gravity of the offence (murder) with 
which Girone had been charged.       
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Dispute concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov and 
Kerch Strait case (Ukraine v. the Russian Federation) 
On 14 September 2016 Ukraine initiated arbitration proceeding against Russia in 
accordance with Annex VII of the LOSC by serving it with a notification and 
statement of claim. Ukraine alleges that Russia has violated its rights as the coastal 
State in the waters off Crimea.30 Ukraine nominated Professor Vaughan Lowe as its 
arbitrator, Russia Judge Golitsyn, President of the ITLOS. The parties were unable to 
agree on the remaining three arbitrators. Thus, in accordance with Article 3(e) of 
Annex VII, their appointment was to be made by the President of the ITLOS. 
However, President Golitsyn was a national of one of the parties and so it fell to the 
Vice-President, Judge Bouguetaia, to appoint the remaining arbitrators. He nominated 
himself and his fellow ITLOS judges, Judges Paik and Gómez-Robledo, with Judge 
Paik being appointed president of the arbitral tribunal.  
 From the limited information that appears to be available in the public domain, 
at least in English, it is not possible to tell how far this case is in reality a dispute 
about sovereignty (Russia’s annexation of Crimea) presented as a dispute relating to 
the interpretation and application of the LOSC, and thus how far it raises issues 
similar to those in the Chagos MPA case.        
 
 
                                                 
30 Statement of the Ministry of Affairs of Ukraine of 15 September 2016, available at 
http://mfa.gov.ua/en/press-center/comments/6313-statement-of-the-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-of-
ukraine-on-the-initiation-of-arbitration-against-the-russian-federation-under-the-united-nations-
convention-on-the-law-of-the-sea; accessed 28 June 2017. Ukraine’s notification and statement of 
claim do not appear to be publicly available.  
53
Conciliation in accordance with Annex V during 2015 and 2016 
 
In Annex V the LOSC sets out a conciliation procedure available to its parties. 
Generally, in accordance with Article 284 and section 1 of Annex V, this procedure 
may be utilised only where both/all the parties to a dispute agree. However, the LOSC 
provides for three situations where one of the parties to a dispute may unilaterally 
refer a dispute for “compulsory conciliation”, although any recommendations made 
by a conciliation commission are not legally binding. The first two situations relate to 
disputes concerning a coastal State’s rights relating to marine scientific research and 
fisheries in the EEZ, where under Article 297(2) and (3) of the LOSC a coastal State 
is not obliged to accept submission of such disputes to binding judicial settlement. 
The third situation relates to disputes relating to maritime boundaries and historic 
bays or titles which one of the parties has excepted from compulsory judicial 
settlement by making a declaration under Article 298(1)(a). Before 2016 the 
conciliation procedure of Annex V had never been invoked, in either its consensual or 
compulsory form. In April 2016 it was invoked for the first time when Timor-Leste 
unilaterally referred a dispute with Australia over their maritime boundary to 
conciliation in accordance with Article 298(1)(a) and section 2 of Annex V, Australia 
having made a declaration under Article 298(1)(a) in 2002. To appreciate the 
significance of Timor-Leste’s action, it is necessary to have some knowledge of the 
extensive background to the dispute. 
In 2002, on the same day that it became independent, Timor-Leste concluded 
the Timor Sea Treaty with Australia, establishing a joint petroleum development area 
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pending delimitation of the maritime boundary between the two States.31 In 2006 
Australia and Timor-Leste signed a further treaty, the Treaty on Certain Maritime 
Arrangements in the Timor Sea (CMATS Treaty),32 which, inter alia, precluded the 
parties from seeking delimitation of their maritime boundary by a court or tribunal for 
the lifetime of the Treaty, envisaged as 50 years. The validity of the CMATS Treaty 
was subsequently challenged by Timor-Leste in arbitral proceedings instituted against 
Australia in 2013.33  
In its Notification Instituting Conciliation, Timor-Leste appointed Judge 
Koroma (formerly of the ICJ) and Judge Wolfrum (of the ITLOS) as conciliators. In 
its Response Australia appointed Dr. Rosalie Balkin and Professor Donald McRae as 
conciliators. In turn the four conciliators appointed Ambassador Peter Taksøe-Jensen 
to serve as Chairman of the Conciliation Commission. 
At the outset of the conciliation proceedings, Australia raised six objections to 
the competence of the Conciliation Commission: (1) Article 4 of the CMATS Treaty 
precluded either Party from initiating compulsory conciliation under Article 298; (2) 
the CMATS Treaty was a provisional arrangement within the meaning of Articles 
74(3) and 83(3) of the LOSC, with the consequence that the moratorium on 
determining a maritime boundary in the Treaty was not displaced by the LOSC; (3) in 
2003, the Parties had agreed by an exchange of letters that the mechanism for 
resolving their maritime boundary dispute was negotiation and that was confirmed by 
the CMATS Treaty, which stipulated that such negotiations were not to begin until 
some future date. The CMATS Treaty was thus an agreement within the meaning of 
                                                 
31 Timor Sea Treaty between the Government of East Timor and the Government of Australia (Dili, 20 
May 2002, in force 2 April 2003), 2258 UNTS 3. 
32 Treaty on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea (Sydney, 12 January 2006, in force 27 
June 2006) 2438 UNTS 358. 
33 For details of the arbitration, see https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/37/; accessed 29 July 2017.  
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Article 281 of the LOSC; (4) the parties’ dispute over maritime boundaries arose in 
2002, prior to the entry into force of the LOSC as between the parties (Timor-Leste 
did not become a party to the LOSC until 2013) and thus the first condition of Article 
298 – that the dispute arise “subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention” – 
was not met; (5) there had been no negotiations on the maritime boundary, which 
Article 298 contemplated would be necessary before a State could resort to 
conciliation; and (6) the dispute was inadmissible because Timor-Leste was seeking 
to seize the Conciliation Commission in breach of its treaty commitments to 
Australia. Timor-Leste contested all of those objections. Australia requested the 
Commission to deal with its objections as a preliminary matter. Following written 
submissions by each party and a hearing, the Commission issued a unanimous 
decision on its competence on 19 September 2016.34 
Unlike Australia, the Commission’s point of departure in determining its 
competence was the LOSC, not the CMATS Treaty. The latter was relevant to the 
question of the Commission’s competence, but only within the framework and from 
the perspective of the LOSC. Within that framework and perspective, an initial (and 
important) point was that a State must first meet the requirements of Section 1 of Part 
XV to enable access not only to the binding procedures of Section 2 but also to the 
compulsory conciliation procedures provided in Section 3. That meant that Article 
281 (the provisions of which were outlined when discussing the South China Sea case 
above) was potentially applicable. The Commission noted furthermore that Article 
                                                 
34 In the Matter of a Conciliation between the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste and the 
Commonwealth of Australia, Decision on Australia’s Objection to Competence, 19 September 2016, 
available at https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1921; accessed 29 July 2017. For early comment see 
N Bankes, ‘Compulsory Conciliation under the Law of the Sea Convention: Rich Pickings in the 
Decision on Objections to Competence of the Timor-Leste/Australia Conciliation Commission’, 
JCLOS blog, posted on 25 October 2016, available at http://site.uit.no/jclos/2016/10/25/compulsory-
conciliation-under-the-law-of-the-sea-convention-rich-pickings-in-the-decision-on-objections-to-
competence-of-the-timor-lesteaustralia-conciliation-commission/#comment-1274; accessed 9 August 
2017. 
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281 provides that “the procedures of this Part” (i.e. Part XV, and including therefore 
compulsory conciliation) apply only where there is no agreement of the kind referred 
to in that Article. The Commission followed the South China Sea case, but with more 
supporting legal argument, in holding that Article 281 applied only to legally binding 
agreements. That meant that the 2003 Exchange of Letters was not relevant. The 
CMATS Treaty, on the other hand, was undoubtedly a legally binding agreement. 
However, it was not an agreement within the meaning of Article 281 because it was 
not an agreement “to seek settlement of the dispute by a peaceful means of [the 
Parties’] own choice.” Nowhere in the CMATS Treaty was there any procedure 
intended to provide for the settlement of maritime boundaries. On the contrary, 
CMATS foreclosed all possible avenues for the resolution of disputes relating to 
maritime boundaries for the period of the Treaty.  
The Commission then turned to Article 298 and the two conditions set out in 
paragraph (1)(a)(i) that must be fulfilled before a conciliation commission may 
operate. The first condition is that a dispute concerning the interpretation or 
application of Articles 15, 74 or 83 has arisen “subsequent to the entry into force of 
the Convention.” On the basis of the use of the quoted phrase elsewhere in the LOSC 
and the negotiating history of Article 298, the Commission held that the phrase 
referred to the general entry into force of the LOSC in 1994, not the entry into force 
as between Australia and Timor-Leste in 2013 (as argued by Australia). The earliest 
that the dispute between the parties could possibly have arisen was when Timor-Leste 
became independent in 2002. Thus, the first condition was satisfied. The second 
condition is that no agreement within a reasonable period of time has been reached in 
negotiations between the parties. The Commission found that that condition had also 
been fulfilled. Article 298 did not expressly require prior negotiations between the 
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parties to the dispute actually to have taken place. Such a requirement would 
effectively grant a party the right to veto any recourse to compulsory conciliation by 
refusing to negotiate. In any case negotiations had taken place at various times. While 
the CMATS Treaty was an agreement resulting from those negotiations, it was not an 
agreement within the meaning of Article 298(1)(a)(i) as it did not purport to resolve 
the dispute concerning the interpretation or application of Articles 74 and 83 of the 
LOSC relating to maritime boundary delimitation. It was at most a provisional 
arrangement of the kind contemplated under Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of the LOSC.  
Having found that the conditions of Article 298 were satisfied, the 
Commission turned to consider Australia’s objection of “admissibility” that the 
Commission should decline to exercise its competence because Timor-Leste had 
commenced the conciliation proceedings in breach of the CMATS Treaty. The 
Commission rejected that argument. The alleged breach of the Treaty was not a matter 
that properly fell to the Commission to consider or decide. As mentioned above, 
Timor-Leste was contesting the validity of the Treaty before the tribunal in the Timor 
Sea Treaty Arbitration and the parties had agreed that the Conciliation Commission 
was not competent to deal with that matter. The Commission could not address one 
aspect of the CMATS Treaty (its alleged breach) without also addressing Timor-
Leste’s defence regarding the validity of the Treaty. 
During the hearing on the Commission’s competence, Timor-Leste had 
requested the Commission not only to assist the parties to reach an agreement on the 
delimitation of permanent maritime boundaries, but also to assist the parties to agree 
on appropriate transitional arrangements in the disputed maritime area and on how to 
dissolve the joint institutions and arrangements set up by the Timor Sea and CMATS 
Treaties. Australia contested the latter role for the Commission. That objection was, 
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however, dismissed by the Commission. Articles 74 and 83 dealt not only with the 
actual delimitation of maritime boundaries but also with the question of the 
transitional period pending a final delimitation and the provisional arrangements of a 
practical nature that States were called on to apply pending delimitation. Those 
matters therefore fell within the scope of a conciliation commission under Article 298 
and the Commission was accordingly competent to accede to Timor-Leste’s request 
that it consider transitional arrangements and the arrangements that might follow the 
termination of the CMATS Treaty. 
Annex V provides that a conciliation commission must complete its work 
within 12 months. The tribunal held that in cases of compulsory conciliation where a 
conciliation commission’s competence was contested, the 12-month period ran from 
the date on which a commission decided that it was competent to deal with a 
conciliation request. Accordingly, in this case the 12-month period would run from 19 
September 2016.   
The Commission’s findings about its competence have a wider application 
than the present conciliation proceedings. It made a number of important 
pronouncements about compulsory conciliation under the LOSC, including the 
relevance of Article 281 (and by similar reasoning Article 282) and the meaning of 
the conditions set out in Article 298(1)(a)(i). While these pronouncements are not 
binding on any later LOSC conciliation commissions, they will certainly be 
persuasive. In robustly and unanimously rejecting some strong objections to its 
jurisdiction from Australia, the Commission not only struck a blow for the weaker 
party in an asymmetric maritime power relationship, but may also encourage the use 
of conciliation by other parties to the LOSC, particularly if it succeeds in helping the 
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parties to reach agreement to resolve what has been a long-running and festering 
dispute.     
         
 
Judicial Settlement of Law of the Sea Disputes outside the Framework of 
Section 2 of Part XV of the LOSC during 2015 and 2016 
 
International Court of Justice 
At the beginning of 2015 four law of the sea cases were pending before the Court – 
the Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and 
Colombia beyond 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua v. 
Colombia) case; the Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in 
the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia) case; the Maritime Delimitation in the 
Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) case; and the 
Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya) case. During 2016 the 
Court gave judgements on jurisdiction in the first two cases, which are discussed 
below. Written proceedings in the Costa Rica v. Nicaragua case were completed 
during 2015, but no hearing had been held by the end of 2016. In the Somalia v. 
Kenya case, Kenya certain preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court and 
the admissibility of Somalia’s application on 7 October 2015. Proceedings on the 
merits were accordingly suspended. The Court had not given a judgment on 
jurisdiction and admissibility by the end of 2016.  
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Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between 
Nicaragua and Colombia beyond 200 nautical miles from the 
Nicaraguan coast (Nicaragua v. Colombia)   
In this case, begun in 2013, Nicaragua has requested the ICJ, first, to delimit the 
boundary between its continental shelf beyond 200 nm and the continental shelf of 
Colombia and, second, “to indicate the rights and duties of the two States in relation 
to the area of overlapping claims and the use of its resources pending the precise 
delimitation of the line of the boundary”.35 It seeks to found the Court’s jurisdiction 
on Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá or, in the alternative, on the Court’s continuing 
jurisdiction arising from its 2012 judgement in the Territorial and Maritime Dispute 
(Nicaragua v. Colombia) case. In August 2014, Colombia raised preliminary 
objections to the jurisdiction of the Court and to the admissibility of Nicaragua’s 
application.  
On 17 March 2016 the Court delivered its judgment in response.36 It rejected 
Colombia’s objections that the case was brought after Colombia’s denunciation of the 
Pact of Bogotá had taken effect and that the necessary preconditions for Article XXXI 
of the Pact had not been satisfied: thus, the Court had jurisdiction on the basis of 
Article XXXI and so it was unnecessary to consider Nicaragua’s alternative basis for 
the Court’s jurisdiction. It also rejected Colombia’s objection that the Court had 
decided Nicaragua’s first request in its 2012 judgment, so that the matter was res 
                                                 
35 Application of Nicaragua, para.2, available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/154/17532.pdf; 
accessed 25 May 2016. 
36 Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia beyond 200 
nautical miles from the Nicaraguan coast (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment 
of 17 March 2016, available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/154/18956.pdf; accessed 25 May 
2016. For early comment on the judgment, see M Lando, ‘Delimiting the Continental Shelf beyond 200 
Nautical Miles at the ICJ: The Nicaragua v. Colombia Cases’ (2017) 16(2) Chinese Journal of 
International Law (in press) (available online); and CG Vega-Barbosa, ‘The admissibility of a claim of 
continental shelf rights beyond 200 nm before an international tribunal absent a recommendation by the 
CLCS: A few words about the ICJ’s 2016 Judgment in Nicaragua v. Colombia’ EJIL Talk!, available at 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/author/gvegabarbosa/; accessed 16 August 2017. 
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judicata, and that Nicaragua was seeking to appeal or revise that judgment. On the 
other hand, the Court held that Nicaragua’s second request was inadmissible as it did 
not reveal the existence of a dispute. Colombia had argued that Nicaragua’s first 
request was also inadmissible as the Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf (CLCS) had not yet considered Nicaragua’s submission relating to its 
continental shelf beyond 200 nm. By eight votes to eight, with the President’s casting 
vote, the Court rejected that objection. The Court considered that “since delimitation 
of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles can be undertaken independently of 
a recommendation from the CLCS, the latter is not a prerequisite that needs to be 
satisfied by a State party to UNCLOS before it can ask the Court to settle a dispute 
with another State over such a delimitation” (para. 114). This appears to be 
inconsistent with the position that the Court had previously taken in the Nicaragua v 
Honduras and Nicaragua v. Colombia cases, but is in line with the approach of the 
ITLOS in the Bangladesh/Myanmar case and the tribunal in the Bangladesh/India 
case.  
 
Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the 
Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia) 
In this case, begun in 2013, Nicaragua claims that Colombia is in breach of its 
obligation not to violate Nicaragua’s maritime zones as delimited by the ICJ’s 
judgment in the Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia) case, and 
its obligation not to use or threaten force contrary to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 
Nicaragua seeks to found the Court’s jurisdiction on Article XXXI of the Pact of 
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Bogotá or, in the alternative, the Court’s “inherent power to pronounce on the actions 
required by its Judgments.”37  
In December 2014, Colombia filed preliminary objections to the jurisdiction 
of the Court. The Court delivered its judgment on those objections on 17 March 
2016.38 The Court upheld Colombia’s objection that it had no jurisdiction to rule on 
Nicaragua’s second claim (breach of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter) as there was no 
dispute between the parties over this question. However, it rejected all of Colombia’s 
other objections, finding that it had jurisdiction under the Pact of Bogotá to consider 





At the beginning of 2015 two law of the sea arbitrations outside the framework of the 
LOSC dispute settlement procedures were pending – one between Croatia and 
Slovenia, the other between Timor-Leste and Australia (referred to above in the 
section on Conciliation). Developments in the Croatia/Slovenia case during 2015 and 
2016 are discussed briefly below.  
 
Croatia/Slovenia 
This case, begun in 2009, concerns the course of the land and maritime boundary 
between Croatia and Slovenia; Slovenia’s “junction to the High Sea;” and “the regime 
                                                 
37 Application of Nicaragua, para. 18, available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/155/17978.pdf; 
accessed 25 May 2016.  
38 Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. 
Colombia), Preliminary Objection, Judgment of 17 March 2016, available at: http://www.icj-
cij.org/files/case-related/155/155-20160317-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf; accessed 9 August 2017.  
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for the use of the relevant maritime areas.”39 The tribunal established to hear the case 
comprises Judge Gilbert Guillaume (president), Professor Vaughan Lowe, Judge 
Bruno Simma, Dr Jernej Sekolec (appointed by Slovenia) and Professor Budislav 
Vukas (appointed by Croatia).  
In July 2015 the tribunal announced that it would deliver its award in mid-
December 2015.40 However, within days of that announcement, its proceedings were 
thrown into complete turmoil. On 22 July a Croatian newspaper published transcripts 
of alleged telephone conversations between Dr Sekolec, and the agent of Slovenia, in 
which they discussed how best to influence the tribunal to rule in Slovenia’s favour.41 
Dr Sekolec resigned the following day.42 On 24 July Croatia informed the tribunal 
that “the entire arbitral process has been tainted” by the above events, and requested it 
to suspend proceedings. Slovenia, however, while deeply regretting what had 
happened, urged the tribunal to “fulfil its mandate” and appointed Judge Abraham 
(President of the ICJ) as a replacement arbitrator.43 On 30 July Professor Vukas, the 
Croatian-appointed arbitrator, resigned.44 The following day Croatia informed the 
tribunal that it could not continue the arbitration “in good faith” and that it had given 
Slovenia notice of its termination of the Arbitration Agreement. On 3 August Judge 
Abraham resigned as arbitrator, explaining that he had agreed to be appointed in the 
39 Arbitration Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Slovenia and the Government of 
the Republic of Croatia, 4 November 2009, Art. 3(1), available at 
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2165; accessed 10 August 2017. 
40 PCA Press Release of 10 July 2015, available at https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1308; 
accessed 10 August 2017. 
41 A Sarvarian and R Baker, ‘Arbitration between Croatia and Slovenia: Leaks, wiretaps, scandal’ EJIL 
Talk!, available at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/arbitration-between-croatia-and-slovenia-leaks-wiretaps-
scandal/; accessed 14 August 2017. See also P. Sands, ‘Reflections on International Judicialization’ 
(2016) 27 European Journal of International Law 885-900 at pp. 895-8.  
42 PCA Press Release of 23 July 2015, available at http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1310; 
accessed 25 May 2016. 
43 PCA Press Release of 28 July 2015, available at http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1313; 
accessed 25 May 2016. 
44 PCA Press Release of 30 July 2015, available at http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1330; 
accessed 25 May 2016. 
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hope that that would help to restore confidence between the parties and allow the 
arbitration to proceed normally, but clearly that had not happened.45     
On 13 August Slovenia informed the tribunal that it “objected to Croatia’s 
purported unilateral termination of the Arbitration Agreement” and argued that the 
tribunal had “a power and a duty to continue the proceedings.” “To preserve the 
integrity, independence and impartiality” of the tribunal, it would refrain from 
appointing an arbitrator to replace Judge Abraham. Instead, it requested the president 
of the tribunal to make appointments to fill the two vacancies on the tribunal in 
accordance with Article 2(2) of the Arbitration Agreement.46 The president acceded to 
that request, and on 25 September 2015 appointed Ambassador Rolf Einar Fife and 
Professor Nicolas Michel as members of the tribunal.47   
On 1 December 2015 the reconstituted tribunal invited the parties to make 
submissions “concerning the legal implications of the matters set out in Croatia’s 
letters of 24 July 2015 and 31 July 2015.” Having received the views of the parties 
and held a hearing (which Croatia did not attend), the tribunal delivered a partial 
award on 30 June 2016.48 It held that Slovenia, by engaging in ex parte contacts with 
the arbitrator originally appointed by it, had violated the Arbitration Agreement. 
However, that violation did not constitute a material breach within the meaning of 
Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and thus did not entitle 
Croatia unilaterally to terminate the Agreement. Furthermore, the violation did not 
affect the tribunal’s ability, in its current composition, to complete its mandate and 
45 PCA Press Release of 5 August 2015, available at http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1389; 
accessed 25 May 2016. 
46 PCA Press Release of 5 August 2015, available at http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1403; 
accessed 25 May 2016.  
47 PCA Press Release of 25 September 2015, available at 
http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1468; accessed 25 May 2016. 
48 Arbitration between Croatia and Slovenia, Partial Award of 30 June 2016, available at 
http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1787; accessed 3 October 2016. 
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render a final award independently and impartially. The arbitration would therefore 
continue.  
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